Why the Nehruvian policy of non-alignment is India’s best bet today
Trump’s efforts to woo India are a recipe for trouble.
The US-China rivalry is heating up quickly. China’s ascension to global power, accompanied by the erosion of the US’s hegemony, has elicited several ominous comparisons with the European power struggle that led to World War 1.
In describing the US-China rivalry, Harvard professor Graham Allison warned that “business as usual – not just an unexpected, extraordinary event – can trigger large-scale conflict. When a rising power is threatening to displace a ruling power, standard crises that would otherwise be contained… can initiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn, produce outcomes none of the parties would otherwise have chosen.”
If there is any truth to Allison’s prognostication that small playground battles can easily escalate into a global turf war, then India should be careful of the role that it accepts in the increasingly antagonistic US-China power struggle.
Since prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s decision to remain non-aligned during the Cold War, India has generally pursued a policy of “strategic autonomy.” Aware of this, the US’s interest in partnership with India has waned every time India has revealed reluctance to commit to the relationship.
More recently, however, China’s rapid rise has forced the US to recommence its courtship dance with potential Asian partners, especially India, despite previous rejections. Hence, in recent remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson tried to find a teammate in India, suggesting that “India needs a reliable partner on the world stage… the United States is that partner.”
Unfortunately, “business as usual” spats between the US and China have become a daily occurrence. A few weeks ago, the Trump administration redoubled its criticism of China’s trade practices and joined the European Union’s efforts to deny China “market economy” status in the World Trade Organization.
Meanwhile, China recently announced the launch of additional fighter and transport aircraft in the South China Sea, despite the US’s longstanding efforts to protect the rule of law and freedom of navigation in Asian waters.
As such, India should continue to be cautious about entering alliances that could expose it to unnecessary risk. As Professor Holger H Herwig explained in his book The First World War, alliances can quickly become liabilities: Vienna expected “full backing from Berlin” for any Balkans action it decided upon, but Berlin couldn’t entirely restrain its ally even when the action didn’t seem, to its mind, to be worth it.
Countries that have no intention of going to war can be forced to do so, just to maintain credibility with their allies. Given that President Trump seems keen to antagonise Xi Jinping, an alliance with the US at this time could be an unnecessary ticket to war.
Unlike President Trump, India cannot afford to antagonise China, for the simple fact that India and China share a 2,500-mile border. As we saw with the clash earlier this year on the Doklam plateau and with the accidental incursion of an Indian drone into Chinese airspace, the two countries are always frighteningly close to conflict.
While it’s easy for Trump to send incendiary tweets while he watches Fox News from the safety of the Oval Office 8,000 miles away, India sits on the frontline and is much more likely to bear the brunt of China’s anger.
Furthermore, India should always respond with caution to “friendly” overtures from a government that views foreign policy in short-sighted “America First” terms. Given the US’s ambition to reassert its relevance in Asia, who knows when India’s growing military and economic power might come to be perceived as a threat by Trump?
Even if Tillerson can teach Trump to avoid spastic Twitter diplomacy, the Trump administration’s friendship with India will last four to eight years at most. India’s border with China will last much longer than that.
Nobody knows how the US-China rivalry will play out over the next several years. Given that the stakes for India have only gotten higher, the Nehruvian non-alignment strategy might be even more applicable today than it was during the Cold War.
If Graham Allison and Holger Herwig are right, Tillerson and Trump’s efforts to woo India are a recipe for trouble. India is better off on the sidelines than caught in the crossfire.