Why Modi is afraid to have a Pakistan policy
Narendra Modi hasn’t been as active on any front as foreign policy. He clearly loves dealing with the world, and arguably, has seen some success. He’s tilted slightly closer to the US, pissed off China a bit, finally signed a boundary agreement with Bangladesh, assured neighbours like Nepal that India’s going to deal with them with respect, and generally raised India’s profile on the global table.
There’s one critical area where Modi’s policy, it seems, is to not have a policy. So mixed are the signals on Pakistan that it appears Modi is still formulating a plan.
Narendra Modi invites Nawaz Sharif for his swearing-in, and then cancels foreign secretary-level talks on a false pretext. Pakistan doesn’t give up its engagement with the Hurriyat leadership in Kashmir, but Modi sends the foreign secretary to Islamabad. Modi claims he’s extending a hand of friendship, but then snubs Nawaz Sharif at the United Nations and the SAARC summit in Kathmandu. A minister suggests India could conduct cross-border raids in Pakistan, and Modi calls up Nawaz Sharif to wish him for Ramzan.
India and Pakistan are each other’s biggest foreign policy thorns. To be confused about what to do about Pakistan, is poor foreign policy. What is clear amidst the apparent confusion is that India is seeking to regionally isolate Pakistan. The “SAARC minus one” strategy is to carry out negotiations and agreements on matters of trade and transport and such like, separately with other SAARC countries, or by forming sub-groups. While this may be a way out to not hold South Asian co-operation hostage to the India-Pakistan dispute, it is not a way out of the need to deal with Pakistan.
It is a myth that India-Pakistan talks have produced no result. In 2003, an agreement resulted in reducing military tensions on the Line of Control, and thus militancy. Cross-LoC travel permits and trade across the border-that-is-not-a-border in Jammu and Kashmir built trust. Talks under the Manmohan Singh government resulted in a relatively more liberal visa regime and hopes of greater trade ties. Pakistan didn’t keep its promise of reciprocating India’s Most Favoured Nation status, but that is a step Pakistan can take if it sees bilateral talks proceeding on all fronts. Those who argue that talks achieve nothing fail to explain what is achieved by not talking.
The strongest argument against India-Pakistan talks remains the history of betrayal by Pakistan in the midst of talks. Modi probably doesn’t want to face the sort of embarrassment that Atal Bihari Vajpayee did, when he was confronted with Kargil soon after starting the Delhi-Lahore bus. Or the difficult situation that Manmohan Singh found himself in, facing the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai just months before the 2009 general elections.
What if a similar incident takes place during Modi’s tenure?
To begin with, if there are no India-Pakistan talks, warm hugs and strong handshakes, Modi will not look like he’s been check-mated like Vajpayee and Manmohan. This will ensure that a big terror attack from the Pakistani soil does not dent Modi’s image as a strong leader. The big question is: What will Modi do in response to such an incident? Will he do what Vajpayee and Manmohan did, which was to practise strategic restraint? Or will he raise military tensions like Vajpayee did after the Parliament attack, and bring us to the brink of war?
Perhaps, Modi’s mixed signals about Pakistan are deliberately meant to keep us guessing on how he intends to deal with Pakistan.
The only problem is that Modi has to visit Islamabad for the SAARC summit in 2016, dates for which have not yet been decided. It is not viable for India’s Pakistan policy to remain one of coldness and isolationism. Not every foreign policy act has to come with pomp and show, photo-ops and big talk. Negotiations with Pakistan are a slow, complex process -they require long-term trust building. The process must begin now. Perhaps, this meeting would be a good place to announce the reopening of talks.