NSG bid: How India plans to win this round of Chinese checkers
The second half of 2008 was a turbulent year for the USA. It was reeling under a severe economic crisis - the worst since the Great Depression. Barack Obama's "Yes We Can" was increasingly resonating across states. George W Bush was being called the lame-duck president. But before the Congress dissolved to pave way for a new one, India and the US created history.
The game changer
The 123 agreement, or the India-US agreement for civil nuclear agreement was given a green signal by American lawmakers in the House of Representatives and the Senate. This after India managed to pull a diplomatic coup by winning a special waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
The 48-member elite nuclear group controlling fuel exports and nuclear technology came into existence as a reaction to India's nuclear tests of 1974 that took the world by storm.
The nuclear agreement and NSG waiver happened though after endless hours of suspense, multi-pronged diplomacy by Indians and Americans alike, and nail-biting negotiations at the special NSG plenary in Vienna .
Ghosts of 2008
As India hopes for a full membership of the NSG, the memories of 2008 have returned to haunt. And this time, the diplomatic Chinese chequers is much harder to win.
If earlier it was about a special waiver to a non-Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory state, this time it is about granting insider access to a nation that can, in the future, create stumbling blocks for aspirants, like arch-rival Pakistan - the all-weather friend of China.
New Delhi, though, has publicly assured it would not be an obstacle to anyone who deserves entry on merit. Beijing now finds New Delhi much closer to US and Japan.
With just a few hours to go to the Seoul meeting, Beijing has signalled that India's membership is not even on the agenda of the plenary meet.
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| Narendra Modi with Xi Jinping. (Reuters) |
A statement issued by the Chinese foreign ministry on June 21 read, "Deliberation on the entry of specific countries is on the agenda of the Seoul Plenary Meeting. However, it is worth noting that the meeting is only to deliberate on the entry application of countries that are state parties to the NPT. As for the entry of non-NPT countries, the group has never put that on its meeting agenda."
This came after Indian foreign minister Sushma Swaraj in her annual press conference had expressed hope that there would be a consensus and India could sail through this June. What complicates the situation is the public stance of the Chinese this time, unlike in 2008, when they were more discreet.
A top retired diplomat privy to the rounds of conversations during India's 2008 NSG waiver push, recalled that Beijing would always stress on "Sino-Indo cooperation on peaceful nuclear use" in meetings. And would add the need "to be careful of nuclear proliferation". Outside of the meeting rooms, Chinese diplomats would bat behind prop nations like Turkey, Ireland, Austria, New Zealand to make life difficult for India. They did not want to be isolated on the multilateral forum and be painted the villain.
Mass diplomatic mobilisation
Eight years back, India and the US embarked upon one of the most heavy-duty diplomatic lobbying ever seen in recent times to open up nuclear commerce for the once pariah New Delhi through the nuclear accord and the NSG waiver.
The Indian ambassador to the United States, Ronen Sen held meetings with a wide cross section of American society - Latinos, black caucus, even white evangelicals, top CEOs, business honchos. Weekend after weekend was spent in constituencies of 246 lawmakers - who understood the strength of zip codes.
The Indian diaspora, including American citizens, was leveraged to score diplomatic points.
At one point with just 14 days to go for a 90-day procedure, a call had to be made to Dr Prabhu Reddy, the personal physician of Harry Reid - then house majority chairman - to help fix a date for the vote on passage of the 123 agreement.
Shyam Saran, PM Manmohan Singh's special envoy on nuclear issues went back and forth to atleast 40 countries to get them on board. The then foreign secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon travelled to Beijing twice in the last few days to woo the Chinese. On every possible occasion - bilateral to multi-lateral - support was sought from Beijing. The Chinese never came out in the open and said no.
The American aggression
But much heavy lifting was done by the Americans themselves. Andrew Small in his book The China Pakistan Axis captures the backroom power play:
"In the closing stages, it appeared that there were two countries blocking the deal - Ireland and Austria. Ireland's consent was finally secured in a phone call between George W Bush and Taoiseach Brian Cowen."
And the then US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice had to break from her landmark visit to Libya to place a call to the German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who managed to track Austrian foreign minister Ursula Plassnik down in Brussels. Plassnik finally instructed her negotiator in Vienna to agree the book recalls.
But China was the toughest cookie and its low-profile negotiators in Vienna were giving sleepless nights to Indian bureaucrats as they struggled with complicated draft negotiations in closed rooms.
Andrew Small writes:
"With the diplomacy in Vienna in danger of unraveling, the focus switched back to the channel between Washington and Beijing. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao had been avoiding calls from the Indian prime minister, but were now on the spot. They blinked. Rice reached Yang Jeichi, the Chinese foreign minister, to urge China not to block the deal."
Ultimately, it was a call from George Bush to Hu Jintao that led the way for a reluctant Chinese assent. This go-ahead was slipped to the Indian interlocutors over the breakfast table in an inconspicuous note by a junior Chinese diplomat on the final day.
Modi's diplomatic litmus test
As bureaucrats once again huddle up behind closed doors in Seoul this Friday (June 24), India's topmost diplomat S Jaishankar will be leading the charge. He had held long discussions with Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the state visit of President Pranab Mukherjee in late May.
President Mukherjee had subtly spoken about wanting to work with China to ensure India has a predictable international environment for nuclear trade and to boost clean energy. He hoped President Xi Jinping would give his "personal attention" to India's expectation. Jaishankar returned to Beijing within a few weeks on a hushed trip to woo the Chinese.
Later, Sushma Swaraj explained, "Foreign Secretary told the Chinese the question of procedures and criterion was already addressed when India was granted the waiver in 2008. We asked the Chinese to judge us on the basis of credentials."
Making a case for India's bid on the NSG table will be Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself along the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meet in Tashkent - as he meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping just hours before the plenary commences.
In the last two years, Modi has travelled across the world, with nuclear energy high on the agenda in most countries. He even did a whirlwind tour of five nations in six days in early June, adding Mexico and Switzerland to the itinerary to assuage their concerns on the NSG issue.
Finance minister Arun Jaitley will also be leveraging Indian markets and trade ties on a China visit this week. Foreign minister Sushma Swaraj has been in touch with at least 23 counterparts, herself answering questions raised by some.
In the last one week, Narendra Modi has spoken to Russian President Valdimir Putin as well as Prime Minister David Cameron of the UK over the phone. The US, along with UK and France has continued to call out to NSG members to take up India's membership issue at the plenary meet despite contrary signals from China.
The external push
But will Barack Obama himself dial numbers like George W Bush? Will Putin, who recently said he has been in discussions with the Chinese over matters that need to be resolved, be able to pull his weight?
If members want, this time it should be easier to come on board as no procedural document needs to be negotiated. India's separation of nuclear facilities has been done. It has been meeting all international safeguards and its nuclear non proliferation record speaks for itself.
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| Narendra Modi with Barack Obama. (Reuters) |
Even without a membership, the NSG waiver allows fuel and technology access to India. The waiver had lifted an over three-decade, US-led world embargo on civil nuclear trade with India. But, if in the near future, NSG amends guidelines, India will not be inside the room to resist changes that might be against its interests.
For instance, in 2011, the NSG adopted amendments that in a way nullified the "clean" waiver given to India in 2008 on transfer of sensitive nuclear technology. "There is a difference in sitting outside and inside the room," Sushma Swaraj had stressed.
The Pakistan paradox
The implicit understanding is that China has hyphenated the entry bid of India and Pakistan that could make other members nervous given Islamabad's proliferation history. And New Delhi might have to pay the cost by bids of both countries being held up for now.
A senior diplomat on conditions of anonymity explains, "Pakistan's value as a proxy against India still outweighs the challenges and threats of terrorism they face from the AfPak region."
As Andrew Small writes:
"The balancing role that Pakistan plays in Beijing's India policy goes well beyond forcing India to keep a large number of its troops and military assets focused on its western frontier, though that undoubtedly helps. It also ensures that India is kept off balance, distracted, absorbing diplomatic, political and strategic energies that could otherwise be directed towards China. It puts a constant question mark over India's aspiration to transcend its own neighbourhood."
Playing to win
For now, South Block is cautious in its optimism. NSG membership will complete a historic circle.
Ironically Modi's own party, the BJP had opposed the nuclear agreement in 2008, and had called then foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee's assurance to the NSG of maintaining India's moratorium on nuclear tests as limiting the country's nuclear sovereignty.
Since coming to power, Narendra Modi has taken bold initiatives to bring nuclear commerce to the centre stage of Indian diplomacy, focussing on nuclear energy as the crucial alternate to fossil fuels. But if the membership does not come through, a consolation could be the assurance of a special plenary in days ahead to discuss India's application.
For Beijing to change its public stance, it would require a price to go through with the loss of face that Indians and Americans could hail as victory.
But this is a round that Mr Modi would like to win to overshadow the UPA legacy of 2008. This round is going down to the wire. And Modi's men are playing to win.