Why 2018 has been a year of realignment for India's foreign policy
The year that went by has been more about course corrections and realignment rather than that of carrying forward the firm policy decisions taken in previous years. The three key wheels of this policy vehicle were "Neighbourhood First", "Act East" and "India and the Gulf" but the administration’s focus was more on realigning and balancing the West and the East. There certainly has been a shift in the US policy in 2017-2018 after Donald Trump took over.
Major resets
While foreign policymakers in India do not wish to call it so but 2018 saw two major “resets”, one with China and the other with Russia. The informal meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Wuhan early this year ended the diplomatic and military stand-off at Doklam.
Despite the dip in ties, China continues to remain India’s largest trading partner. “We should not be alarmed by the fact that China’s influence in South Asia is increasing. Instead, we should focus on whether the influence is good or bad and how to respond to it,” said former Foreign Secretary of India, S Jaishankar, in his article published in the March-April issue of the India Foundation Journal.
The informal summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin where the two leaders upgraded this traditionally close relationship to a “special privileged strategic partnership”, came in the backdrop of closer ties and defence cooperation between Moscow and Islamabad – an unprecedented diplomatic manoeuvre that left New Delhi with little option.
The annual summit with Russia culminated with the two sides signing the S-400 Long Range Surface to Air Missile System. While the Modi-Putin meeting emphasised the importance of staying the course on strategic partnership which seemed to have fallen by the wayside with a focus on relations with America, the deal came under the shadow of America’s CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) wherein India is yet to get a “waiver” from President Trump.
India took two important policy decisions that could have deep ramifications on ties with the United States of America – continuing buying defence equipment from Russia and oil from Iran.
Despite the strain caused due to the positions taken by New Delhi, the Indo-US 2+2 dialogue took place with India and the US signing Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) that will lead to a new generation of bilateral military partnership. Experts believe that most of the countries see that India is the “largest” “emerging” market. Therefore, one is witnessing tremendous “accommodation” of Indian interests.
While looking at the larger picture, India floundered on regional and neighbourhood policies with China gaining ground in the region and India losing much of its grip. The change of tide in the Maldives was a welcome development for India.
Focus on neighbours
Bhutan has seen a change in power that India would have to work towards. Nepal witnessed Oli return to power, one who is considered close to Beijing. Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh is having a difficult time explaining to her constituents, ahead of elections in December, why Teesta waters agreement still hasn’t come through and what would Dhaka do if India were to implement NRC and oust the so-called “illegal immigrants” back to Bangladesh.
On the issue of Rohingya refugees, while India took a tough position against the Suu Kyi administration, the refugees got no real support from New Delhi. India went on to call the Rohingya a “threat” to national security and relegated its position to merely an aid provider.
In the immediate neighborhood, ties have reached a new low with Pakistan after the announcement and then cancellation of talks with the Imran Khan administration on the sidelines of the UNGA Summit in New York.
Afghanistan certainly has been a focus area and the recent decision to stay the course on the Chabahar project with Iran is to ensure that there is a route to Afghanistan circumventing Pakistan that would give India and its partners strategic space. India has also managed to keep some semblance of continuance in its West Asia policy with some major incoming and outgoing visits. Prime Minister Modi broke the jinx of an Indian premier never travelling to Israel because of the Israel-Palestine hyphenation.
Growing influence
Finally, in the strategic sphere, coining of the phrase Indo-Pacific and finding acceptance from US, Australia and Japan with Russia and China reluctant or averse to the idea of this change shows India’s growing influence in these waters. But unfortunately, India is yet to take the bold step and upgrade its engagement on the Quadrilateral front. The Quad meetings that have taken place so far have not moved beyond joint secretary level. The political will is still amiss on taking a leadership position on this front.
While the world is divided between US and China and who favours whom, India managed to become a member of the SCO with a strong push from Russia at the same time as China pushed Pakistan in. Similarly, while India has become a member of three out of the four key multilateral nuclear export control regimes. India became a part of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies in December 2017.
Earlier it became part of, the Australia Group (AG) for control of chemical and biological technology that could be weaponized and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for the control of rockets and other aerial vehicles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The fourth one is the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), for the control of nuclear related technology; where India has found China to be the biggest impediment. China argues that if India gets in so should Pakistan although Islamabad has a terrible nuclear proliferation record.
Despite the many engagements between Modi and Xi Jinping, the former has failed to convince the latter to corner Pakistan on two fronts nuclear and terrorism.
(Courtesy of Mail Today)