Why we, the BJP, lost Delhi elections to AAP

The only thing I was right about was that the exit polls would be wrong. However, I did not expect that the direction of their wrongness would be northwards and that the AAP would secure almost all seats in the 70 member Assembly. The splendid performance of the AAP and the equally spectacular drubbing of the BJP is a testament to how often we sail in a boat with no compass.

The easy answer to the BJP's defeat lies all across the newspapers and in studio rooms. Some have concentrated their analysis around the choice of the CM candidate, or the earlier choice of no CM candidate. All said and done, there is a lot that has been said about what could have done us in. The real picture, however, is a tapestry of errors, some endemic, some accumulated, some addressed wrongly, some unaddressed still. Add to that circumstance and you get a smorgasbord of reasons why the BJP, in spite of holding on to its core vote base of about 33 per cent consistently over many years has been unable to enjoy incremental growth beyond its critical mass.

At the other end, the AAP has not only succeeded in solidifying its core vote base that comprises the erstwhile Congress-BSP Dalit voter, but now also the minority vote base. The game-changer for AAP has been the grace period it got after it demitted office under a cloud of opprobrium but which it used it to consolidate its position and build on until fresh elections were finally called. The BJP conversely erred in dithering and kept the entire state unit in limbo.

However, some of the key reasons why the same period was used by AAP well and not the BJP has to do with culture. The start-up AAP took nothing for granted, became industrious, could depend on nothing and micro managed everything leading up to its best asset - its volunteers' passion and a calculated mass outreach programme. Given to a more traditional format that befits its size, and present sense of invincibility, the BJP moved like an elephant - relying on size and organisation, centrally commandeered strategies which often were seen at variance with local estimations and planning with a sense of déjà vu. In this it was their operational style that put AAP at an advantage.

On substance too, the AAP had to work little. Their message was limited to subsidised living and they harped only on this aspect of their governance temperament during their 49-day rule earlier last year, but it was enough to capture the attention of its core electorate. The incremental voter they added on was largely due to the messaging vacuum that BJP allowed to develop between itself and the voters - unable to articulate a credible reason why it was best positioned to serve Delhi. Much else that can be said to have gone wrong, we will leave for internal discussions.

Many political pundits have said that we had it coming, but post facto genuflection can never pass off as genuine intuition unless stated publicly. And yet, we are hardly concerned about psephologists getting it wrong. I am more concerned about the fifth consecutive loss for the BJP in Delhi over the last 17 years. Something's obviously broken and needs fixing.