India's plan to diplomatically isolate Pakistan is not enough

In the wake of the Uri attack, India has announced that it will seek to diplomatically isolate Pakistan from all forums. This is a good step, but it will not be sufficient to deter Pakistan from using terrorism as tool of foreign policy if history offers with heuristics.

From 1990 to 2001, Pakistan was thoroughly isolated and encumbered with multiple layers of sanctions related to its nuclear weapons program as well as General Musharraf's 1999 coup. In addition, specific organisations in Pakistan were also penalised due to the violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime by Pakistan and China.

Nonetheless, during this period, Pakistan was able to sustain a sanguinary civil war in Afghanistan using its own resources while simultaneously enabling Sikh terrorists fighting for a so-called Khalistan in India's Punjab, and ramping up its support to terrorists and insurgents ravaging India-administered Kashmir. If Pakistan could simultaneously engage in such profound and diverse sub-conventional activities during a period of deep isolation, what makes New Delhi think that its proposed efforts to diplomatically isolate Pakistan today will coerce Islamabad to abjure its well-honed use of Islamist terrorism?

Clearly, diplomatic isolation alone will not work. One mechanism that India should consider is the process of listing persons under UN Security Council Resolution 1267. If one observes the social media feeds of terrorist organisations proscribed by the United Nations - such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Falah Insaniat Foundation - one finds that they are involved in a variety of international and domestic activities. (Both groups are the operational names under which Lashkar-e-Taiba currently operates.)

One sees these organisations engaging in so-called relief activities not only throughout Pakistan, but also in Somalia, Turkey, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Bangladesh among other countries with large Muslim populations. At first blush, this is gobsmacking. Why would these countries provide visas to individuals associated with a proscribed terrorist organisation? Alas, the reason is simple: the ban pertains to people, not organisations.

However, individuals so listed cannot travel, cannot have a bank account, and are not entitled to possess weapons. Admittedly, the third deprivation cannot be enforced when they enjoy state sanctuary like that provided by Pakistan.

India must work with the United States and other members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to ensure that more people are designated.

To derive the most benefit from these designations, the persons so listed should be of operational import, such as those persons who are pivotal in moving money or recruiting personnel for militant operations. Many of these persons have front businesses in foreign countries.

Once they are designated, others will not want to engage in business with them fearing that they too may become designated. Once these persons are "burned", the terrorist organisation has to replace them. This takes time and, consequently, has an operational impact upon the organisation. Operationally-notable persons will certainly not be as familiar as some of the high-value leadership who are often in the news. India should specifically try to provide information on persons in the Pakistan army and the ISI who are facilitating these groups. This will send an important signal to Pakistan's military, which has remained fairly unhurt by this policy of proxy warfare.

There can be no doubt that China will bleat about such concerted efforts to list persons associated with Pakistan's terror apparatus because Beijing remains Islamabad's proxy on the security council. India will have to work with China on this issue by socialising China to this step privately before undertaking such initiatives publicly. India will have to form strong coalitions on the security council to isolate China should it be intransigent.

One hopes that the United States will work to persuade China that it is not helping the latter's international standing to continue defending the indefensible. As it is, China's behaviour in the South China Sea shows little regard for international norms. Its complicity in protecting Pakistan's terrorists requires greater political and diplomatic pressure from all members of the security council. If China refuses to be constructive, it should be forced to explain why it continues to provide cover for Pakistan's use of terrorism.

These measures should be taken in addition to the other diplomatic, political or military initiatives taken by India, which, it seems, has few options that are relatively risk-free. It needs to make the most of the tools it does have. This is a potential weapon in India's evolving diplomatic and political arsenal.