The international community has finally and strongly endorsed India’s membership in the recent meeting on June 26 for membership of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and is likely to do that for other multilateral export control regimes, such as The Australia Group on chemical and biological weapons, Wassenaar Arrangement on military and dual-use export controls, and International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
India joined the elite MTCR a day after its inability to join the NSG club.
Moratorium
With a leap in nuclear research, capability and technology, India’s aspirations for membership into this ultimate international forum will allow access to international markets and state-of-the-art foreign technologies.
India’s credibility, sense of purpose and responsibility as a nuclear state is reflected in its declared fundamentals of voluntary moratorium on underground nuclear tests, readiness to follow IAEA safeguards and abiding by the spirit of CTBT and NPT.
India’s nuclear doctrine is not just unique but unparalleled in international deterrence, by its core strengths of being non-offensive, non-proliferative and minimally deterrent.
India’s admission being contextualised to China’s opposition, or agreement to hyphenating India and Pakistan for quid pro quo membership, is just bizarre. |
The pledge of No First Use (NFU) in face of adversaries like China who have withdrawn their pledge of NFU, and Pakistan with its self proclaimed irrational nuclear rationality, reflects the limit to which India is prepared to go.
The US–India nuclear deal of September 5, 2008, legitimising India’s access to nuclear fuel supplies was a display of conviction which the US and the members of the NSG showed in India’s unblemished record.
A prudent introspection of China’s nuclear resume will be in order here.
Beginning in the 1970s, China’s position on NPT openly swayed between an outcry against superpowers’ nuclear monopoly on one hand, and calling for a complete ban on nuclear weapons and their ultimate elimination.
China’s clandestine transfer of unsafeguarded heavy water and LEU to Argentina and South Africa was followed by supplies of ring magnets and heavy water, setting up nuclear reactors, transfer of missile technology, and blue prints for comprehensive nuclear weapon programme to Pakistan.
Report
In the period between 1998 and 2004, China supported North Korea in its space programme to develop satellites. The interception of North Korean freighter Kuwolsan in 1999 carrying an assembly line for Scud ballistic missiles intended for Libya, added to global concerns.
Secret reports declassified by various countries later confirmed China’s transfer of missile parts, and kits of M9 and M11 were supplied to Pakistan, Libya, Syria and Iran in flagrant violation of MTCR guidelines.
As Shirley A Kan records in his 2015 congressional report, deliberations by the House International Relations Committee on May 18, 2004 questioning China’s nuclear reactors being built in Pakistan, was swept aside on the assumption that membership of NSG would add multilateral influences on China’s nuclear technology export policies.
The US, for reasons of its own, literally pushed China into the NSG in 2004, unopposed.
Credibility
The NSG meet of June 26 was not just about India being denied admission into NSG by China and four other members, but more importantly, about the inability of the majority of the members including global and super powers, in enabling a prospective member’s entry at the hands of two super proliferators.
India’s admission being contextualised to China’s opposition, or agreement to hyphenating India and Pakistan for quid pro quo membership, is not just bizarre but will never have acceptability.
Finally, the big moral question for the NSG group is on China’s credibility in upholding the spirit of non-proliferation and MTCR guidelines even as a partner, leave alone being guardian to the objectives of NSG.
Perhaps prudence on part of NSG members may require an introspection not just of China’s veto but the very credibility of China’s membership.
As NSG works under the principle of unanimity, India will have to respect every member’s viewpoint.
However, for the other members who opposed India’s bid citing its non-NPT status and on grounds that it will disturb strategic stability in South Asia, positions will need to be reviewed and founded on realistic national perceptions and convictions to uphold the objectives of this elite group.
That India will, by its credentials, global support and momentum, soon be part of this group as also for the other export control regimes, is undisputed.
But one outcome will be subtle yet permanent; this massive outreach by PM Modi for membership into NSG has brought the global community with India on issues that will guide and ensure stability and peace in the long term.
(Courtesy of Mail Today.)