Manipur attack: How the spectre of violence has returned

A convoy of 6 Dogra was ambushed in the Manipur on June 4, 2015. Earlier, on May 3, an ambush had led to the death of eight soldiers in the Mon district of Nagaland. These incidents raise concerns not merely as a result of the 20 soldiers reported to have been killed on Thursday, but because of the larger threat of terrorism that seems to be emerging from the region.

In 1993, a deadly ambush of the convoy of the commanding officer (CO) of 16 Maratha LI, led to the death of the valiant CO of the battalion, Col NJ Nair, though not before he distinguished himself in a fierce firefight. He was awarded the highest peace time gallantry award, the Ashoka Chakra for his actions. The initial assessment of the ambush on June 4, on the basis of media reports and inputs from sources within the army, is suggestive of a degree of sophistication that is reflective of past actions undertaken by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), during the pre-ceasefire days. This threat indicates a growing capacity of terrorist groups, their ability to forge a unified operational entity, internecine conflicts in the region for influence and finally the militants' ability to retain a safe sanctuary in the neighbouring areas of Myanmar.

The capability to plan, lay and spring an ambush with precision on a large body of troops requires the ability to bring together a number of tactical attributes. These come from years of experience, knowledge of the area of operations and a patient study of the routine of an adversary. The incident in focus seems to have brought all these factors together. It also seems to have witnessed the capacity of the terrorists to concentrate both men and material at the point of action successfully. While adequate inputs regarding terrorist fatalities are unavailable, initial reports suggest relatively limited casualties on their side. The reason for attempting to analyse these factors is not to extol the virtues of the terrorists, it is to merely highlight the increasing sophistication of their actions in the recent past in order to help draw important conclusions.

There is little doubt that this incident will spur the Army, which functions on close bonds of camaraderie and esprit-de-corps, to introspect and rise to the challenges faced. However, it must simultaneously raise requisite concerns amongst organisations which are collectively responsible for counterterrorism in the region. First, it demands better coordination between the local police, which forms the grassroot source of intelligence, and the Army to enable seamless sharing of information. More often than not, it is not the absence of intelligence, but the inability to share it and synthesise it that has been the reason for failure. Secondly, it raises the need for agencies to better monitor intelligence both at the technical and human levels. Technical intelligence has been a major success in Jammu and Kashmir, which is one of the reasons for the desperation of terrorist groups to shift to safer means of communication. Similar advances in developing capacities need to be made in the northeast.

Furthermore, the seemingly easy to and fro movement from across Myanmar remains a challenge for security forces fighting terrorism in the hinterland. This brings in the role of border guarding agencies, their capacity, numbers, deployment pattern and ability to operate in largely underdeveloped and difficult areas. Past lessons in management of the Line of Control (LoC), have illustrated that infiltration can be reduced to a trickle, despite the active involvement of Pakistan, if some of these factors are addressed. It needs to be borne in mind that a group of ten men can successfully stop and neutralise an infiltration bid by a much larger group. However, once infiltration takes place, often, even a division of 15,000 men may prove to be inadequate to track down the infiltrators successfully. This is because terrorists excel in the art of spreading into inhospitable areas often with the support of the local population, in small groups, with excellence in the art of guerrilla warfare.

There are conflicting reports regarding the terrorist group responsible for the ambush in Manipur. One report suggests the involvement of the United Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFW), which represents a new group comprising of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang), or NSCN(K), Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Songbijit), or NDFB(S) faction. Yet another, quotes the NSCN(K) spokesperson taking responsibility for the attack along with the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP).

The composition of the groups suggests a tussle between rivals for influence, both political and economic. The NSCN(K) was in a ceasefire agreement with the government until March. However, it voluntarily pulled out, as it felt marginalised in comparison with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah), or NSCN(I-M), which not only had a ceasefire but was also negotiating the peace settlement on behalf of the Nagas. NSCN(K) also brokered a settlement with the Myanmar government, thereby reducing their reliance on areas in India for sanctuary and support. Traditionally, these groups have represented tribal affiliations and wield the gun on their behalf. Over a period of time, income through taxes from their respective areas has expanded to the control over government contracts, affiliations with political entities, control over smuggling routes and day-to-day business activities. The series of ambushes represents a violent challenge by the NSCN(K) and its affiliates to the government for a greater say in the future of the region. It also reflects a battle for inter-se influence amongst regional terrorist groups for the potential spoils of any settlement that may be negotiated and the benefits of large scale infrastructure development, which in turn implies contractual spin-offs. The NSCN(K) did not traditionally have an influence in the Chandel district of Manipur. The ambush indicates its desire to join forces with Meitei terrorist groups to have a greater say in the regional balance of power, especially in relation to the NSCN(I-M).

From a security perspective, the recent successes of terrorists in different states, dominated by separate terrorist groups, suggest a high order of synergy which has been achieved. The new found cohesion is likely to extend beyond operations to cooperation in the establishment and provision of sanctuaries in Myanmar by groups like the NSCN(K), which has entered into an agreement with the Myanmar government for autonomy. It has guaranteed it interference-free areas for camps. It will also facilitate the movement of weapons from across the border and its distribution amongst groups across safe corridors running along the areas of influence of these groups. The provision of training and tactical knowledge by experienced groups like the NSCN(K) to the others in planning and execution of such operations is also a distinct possibility. All these actions are likely to ensure that the combined impact of terrorist platforms created is more than the sum of each of them individually. It will also enhance their collective bargaining ability with the Government of India, in case of any future negotiations.

Past experience suggests that countering violent groups is a long-drawn process, with military means merely creating conditions for political solutions to be carved out through painstaking negotiations. It is also evident that the smokescreen of political negotiations can lower the guard and result in avoidable casualties. The recent ambushes suggest that the three-pronged initiative of military operations with a human touch, local development and political negotiations must be pursued simultaneously in order to achieve peace in the region. Until the fruition of these efforts is witnessed, efforts to strengthen every aspect of law enforcement must be ensured. And finally, there are different routes to peace. History in the region indicates that a political settlement is the most cost effective from the perspective of the local people, who become the first victims in the crossfire of conflict.