Manipur ambush: Why Indian Army is to blame for losing 18 soldiers
There is a belief that afflicts many in India, alleged experts as well as ordinary citizens, that only jihadis of the Islamic State or al Qaeda, Pakistan-backed militants in Kashmir, or Maoists, alone pose a serious national security threat. That ethnic militant groups in India's Northeast still remain an extremely well organised and heavily armed potent threat is often overlooked, with tragic consequences. This was brought home again on June 4, 2015.
On that fateful morning, a convoy of the 6 Dogra Regiment of the Indian Army was ambushed on a remote stretch of the highway in Chandel district of Manipur, which borders Myanmar. When it was all over, 18 soldiers of the 6 Dogra Regiment, deployed in the district for counter insurgency operations lay dead - many of them charred beyond recognition in their vehicles - blown up by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) rounds fired on the them.
The daring ambush on the Army, causing one of the heaviest casualties in decades, seems to have shocked many and led to wild speculations about whether this signals a turning point and the end of a period of relative peace, and what India's response should be. To those who are intimately aware of how the multitude of ethnic insurgencies have evolved and been mutated in the last three decades in India's Northeast, however, this attack has not come as a surprise.
What triggered the ambush?
The key to understanding the recent spate of attacks on the Indian forces in the Northeast lies in understanding how the Naga "peace process" has evolved or unravelled with two of the main Naga ethnic rebel groups, Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) and Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K).
The decades-old Naga insurgency took a decisive turn towards a negotiated peace with a formal ceasefire between NSCN (IM), the faction of NSCN headed by Issac Swu and Thwingaling Muivah, and the government of India, coming into effect on August 1, 1997. A little over a year later, the other faction, NSCN (K), headed by SS Khaplang followed suit and entered into an informal ceasefire from November 14, 1998. This ceasefire was formalised on April 28, 2001. The ceasefire agreements, it must be kept in mind, were effective only in the territory of the state of Nagaland although both the NSCN factions operated in the Naga-inhabited areas of at least three more states in the Northeast - Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam.
Even though both the groups had insisted for the extension of ceasefire without territorial limits, this could never be formally accepted and implemented. When the Indian government had very imprudently extended the ceasefire with NSCN (IM) "without territorial limits" in July 2001, violent protests broke out in Manipur, compelling it to hastily withdraw it and limit it to only Nagaland. But an unwritten understanding evolved between the Centre and both the factions of NSCN of an informal ceasefire in areas outside Nagaland they used to operate.
The trajectory of negotiations with the government, however, evolved very differently for the two NSCN factions. For NSCN (IM), the ceasefire endured and a formal "peace process" progressed, in spite of numerous provocations and violations of ceasefire ground rules. Even as early as July 2010, I had quite accurately predicted that the peace process will eventually succeed, and though both the Indian government and NSCN (IM) are still tight-lipped about the details, sovereignty won't mean secession from India, nor would it mean the integration of all Naga-inhabited areas across different adjacent states into one state (Quietening on the Eastern front).
A key factor in how the negotiations unfolded for NSCN (IM) was also the fact that both Issac Swu and Thwingaling Muivah are from Naga-inhabited areas in India. While Swu is from the powerful Sema tribe, Muivah belongs to the Tangkhul tribe that is dominant in the Ukhrul district of Manipur. While the struggle for Naga sovereignty was apparently for unification of Naga-inhabited areas of both India and Myanmar, NSCN (IM) had clearly jettisoned this as unrealistic. Over the years, the ceasefire brought a peace dividend for the government in the form of a considerable dip in militancy-related violence and casualties. On the other hand, it has enabled NSCN (IM) to come over-ground, establish its headquarter at Camp Hebron in Dimapur, and begin to run a virtual parallel government in Nagaland - its own "Government of People's Republic of Nagaland" with its own "law enforcers" and "ministers". Its deeply entrenched nexus with the political entities engaged in "constitutional" electoral politics is one of our worst-kept secrets.
In contrast to Swu and Muivah, Khaplang is a Hemi Naga from Myanmar. Though there have always been substantial number of Nagas from India in NSCN (K), including in leadership positions, Khaplang has ruthlessly maintained his preeminence not only within NSCN (K) but also in the territory in Myanmar that he controls. While he utilised the opportunity provided by the ceasefire on the Indian side to consolidate his strength and raise "taxes", the euphemism used for extortion, he didn't feel compelled to make any real progress in the negotiation for peace with the Indian government.
The "peace process" remained confined to merely a ritual of extending it annually in April by another year. There is a good reason for this. Over the decades, Khaplang has methodically carved out a rudimentary semi-autonomous "state" out of the Naga-inhabited areas in the Sagaing division in Myanmar adjacent to the Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Manipur, territory which has remained virtually "ungoverned" by the military junta in Yangon, and later Naypyidaw. Khaplang's "Government of People's Republic of Nagaland (GPRN)" in "eastern Nagaland" in the Naga-inhabited areas of western Myanmar may not have been formally recognised, but he was indisputably its de-facto ruler. This reality is underscored by the fact that as early as 2001, Khaplang had reached an unwritten understanding with the Burmese military for cessation of hostilities that endured for more than a decade.
In April 2012, this was signed into a formal agreement by both the parties, virtually recognising Khaplang's status. It is this "immunity", which the NSCN (K) enjoyed in the territory in Myanmar it held, which has attracted more than a dozen ethnic insurgent groups, primarily from Assam and Manipur, to seek out Khaplang's alliance, protection, and his consent to build their bases and training camps in his territory in "eastern Nagaland". This became even more important for them when many of these groups lost their sanctuaries in Bhutan and Bangladesh after the governments there cracked down on them.
While the media has been abuzz with the "announcement" of the formation of the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFW) barely a month earlier on May 4, 2015, which is an alliance formed by NSCN (K), United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Songbijit (NDFB-S) and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), and headed by Khaplang, the reality is that such a de facto alliance already existed on the ground. It also included several of the powerful Meitei groups from Manipur.
Even though the UNLFW's formal announcement did not carry the signature of any of the leaders of the Meitei groups such as the UNLF, PLA, Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) or People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), it is believed that the absence of their signatures was only due to minor procedural delays and they are an integral part of this latest formation. That such a de facto alliance existed on the ground in NSCN (K)-held territories in Myanmar, and that efforts were on to give it a more formal shape, has been substantiated by journalist Rajeev Bhattacharyya (Rendezvous With Rebels: Journey to Meet India's Most Wanted Men, Harper Collins, 2014) who trekked all the way to the NSCN (K) headquarters towards the end of 2011 and interviewed both ULFA's military chief Paresh Baruah as well as NSCN (K) Chairman SS Khaplang. A formal alliance of the seven Meitei groups called the CorCom already existed since 2010 and Bhattacharyya was witness to meetings of several top leaders of some of these organisations coming together in December 2011 to give the alliance a final shape.
While the "peace process" with NSCN (IM) had gathered momentum, some among the NSCN (K) leadership feared that they would be left out because of the intransigence of Khaplang. This led to the split in June 2011 with General Khole Konyak and Kilonser Kitovi Zimmomi walking out of the group with their band of followers and forming the fourth faction called the NSCN (Kitovi-Zimmomi). Khaplang's unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace-process should have been apparent long ago to those who were "engaged" in negotiating with his group. Journalist Rajeev Bhattacharyya recounts Khaplang's reply to him when asked about whether the Indian government ever proposed talks with him:
"We are not particularly bothered, and we will not go for talks unless there is commitment from the government that the focus of the dialogue would be the independence of the Naga territory. So even if there is a proposal, we are likely to reject it."
The "ceasefire" meant very different things to NSCN (IM) and Khaplang. For the former, it meant a path to power, eventually emerging in Nagaland and neighbouring states as a political entity contesting elections within the parameters of India's Constitution. For the latter, it meant continuing to enjoy the cessation of hostilities with Indian forces to enable him to recruit and collect "taxes" in the Naga-inhabited areas in India while concentrating in giving shape to his rudimentary Naga state in Myanmar. It is actually a surprise that New Delhi took so long to understand this.
On March 27, 2015, SS Khaplang announced a unilateral withdrawal of NSCN (K) from the 14 year-old ceasefire with the Indian government. That it took New Delhi completely by surprise was evident. Chairman of Ceasefire Supervisory Board (CFSB) Lieutenant General (retired) NK Singh, when contacted, said the ministry of home affairs was yet to receive any official intimation on the abrogation of the ceasefire. "I only got to read about it in the paper," he said.
Khaplang followed up the ceasefire withdrawal quickly with the expulsion of its representatives in the CFSB, Y Wangtin Naga and P Tikhak, when they opposed Khaplang's decision. This has now led to another split in the NSCN (K), with the faction headed by Wangtin and Tikhak appearing as NSCN (Reformation).
The question that naturally arises is what led to Khaplang unilaterally withdrawing from the ceasefire after 14 years?
One needs to go beyond the rhetoric doled out by NSCN (K) to understand this. Nagaland had been important for NSCN (K) as a major source of recruitment and funds, and the ceasefire enabled his organisation to run an almost parallel government, alongside the "elected" government in Nagaland and the NSCN (IM)'s government - also called the GPRN. While no one has done an authoritative study of the quantum of funds collected by NSCN (K) from extortion and siphoning off of public funds, it used to be substantial (Wages of War).
Withdrawing from the ceasefire would naturally disrupt NSCN (K)'s activities substantially. If Khaplang was willing to endure this, it is an indication that he has created substantial avenues for "revenue" elsewhere and the funds extorted from Nagaland are no longer critical for the survival of the GPRN in Myanmar. The territory Khaplang exercises control over is rich in mineral resources and a formal ceasefire with the junta in Naypyidaw is indicative that substantial sources of revenue from elsewhere have become accessible to NSCN (K). The withdrawal from the ceasefire also frees Khaplang from the increasing pressures he has been under from the government for his unwillingness to deny sanctuary to the other ethnic militants from the Northeast in his territory. Now he has no such obligations to uphold. Another reason is also that Khaplang has always been suspicious of his colleagues who were based in Nagaland and were left to deal with the Indian government. He suspects both New Delhi and NSCN (IM) are continuously trying to create splits in the ranks and weaken his hold on the NSCN (K) on the Indian side. What must be kept in mind is that Khaplang is a seasoned guerrilla warrior and an astute leader who has spent a greater part of his life in the jungles, unlike his other former compatriots who chose to live in relative luxury in foreign capitals. He still lives it rough at this ripe old age. He was sure to have calculated the risks of the withdrawal from the ceasefire and the challenges he would immediately face.
Withdrawal from the ceasefire also led to resumption of hostilities as NSCN (K) began to target security forces.
On April 2, 2015, three soldiers of the 4 Rajput Regiment of the Indian army were killed and four were critically injured when heavily-armed militants ambushed their convoy in Tirap district of Arunachal Pradesh bordering Nagaland. Even though no one claimed responsibility, the needle of suspicion is obviously pointed at NSCN (K).
On 26 April 2015, a soldier of 19 Assam Rifles was killed when suspected NSCN (K) militants ambushed a security patrol team near Red Cross complex in Kohima town. They are also believed to be behind the detonation of two bombs in Kohima and at least one in Dimapur after the abrogation of truce.
A week later, in neighbouring Manipur on May 1, 2015, four suspected NSCN (K) militants were killed in an encounter with the Assam Rifles in Tamenglong district. Till the abrogation of the ceasefire, an informal truce existed between NSCN (K) and the Indian forces for more than a decade in Manipur.
NSCN (K)'s response came in less than 48 hours in neighbouring Nagaland. On the morning of May 3, 2015, NSCN (K) ambushed and killed eight soldiers in Mon district of Nagaland and neighbouring Changlang district of Arunachal Pradesh. Seven of the soldiers belonged to Assam Rifles and one to a territorial army unit of the Naga Regiment of the Indian Army.
To anyone who has been monitoring these developments, it was evident that hostility between NSCN (K) and Indian forces was intensifying.
India's elite terror investigation agency, the National Investigation Agency (NIA), took up the cases of the attacks on soldiers in Tirap, Kohima and Mon. Acting swiftly, the NIA arrested NSCN (K)'s "finance secretary", Khekaho Rochill (34) from Dimapur, Nagaland, on May 28, 2015. The arrest of a senior functionary was certain to invite retribution. That came on the morning of June 4, 2015. And when it was all over, 18 soldiers of the 6 Dogra Regiment of the Indian Army lost their lives.
It is thus beyond dispute that the attack on the army convoy was a result of the intensifying hostility between the NSCN (K) and Indian forces. That NSCN (K)-led the attack is already officially acknowledged. It is also, however, certain that the strike team also consisted cadres from the Meitei insurgent groups who are in alliance with NSCN (K). What caused such high casualty of troops, one of the worst in decades, is the "complacency" that has crept into the way the forces have been operating as a result of the more than a decade of the "peace dividend" due to the ceasefire.
While we will have to wait for the investigation to conclude to learn the exact sequence of events that led to the tragedy, it is evident that the convoy that was ambushed did not adhere to standard operating procedure while on movement. That is the reason two of the army vehicles could be gutted in an IED blast and RPG attack without offering its occupants even a chance to disembark and defend themselves. The charred bodies in the vehicles are a testimony to this. What also cannot be brushed under the carpet is almost criminal intelligence failure. That there was just one casualty on the side of the attackers against 18 dead and 15 critically wounded of the army is indicative that there was total surprise. That the attackers managed to keep the convoy pinned down for a long time and that barring one of their comrades the rest could safely get away is indicative that they were not just heavily armed, but also sufficiently large in number and had recced the area meticulously prior to the attack. How could the movement of such a large number of insurgents have gone unnoticed is something that will have to be investigated well. Another question that arises is how could they have laid in wait if they did not have prior information of the movement of the convoy? And how did they obtain that? If the movement of the convoy was a routine one, and took place daily, wasn't it obvious that it fell into a pattern and was vulnerable to ambushes? What was being done to prevent this?
What should be India's response to the Manipur ambush?
Even before we begin to discuss about India's response, what needs to be focused on is to prevent more such tragedies precipitating out of complacency. Khaplang is a seasoned guerrilla warrior and knows how to put pressure on the forces. For him to extend the battlefront, it will just need an attack on the forces somewhere in Assam. This could be carried out using the anti-talk factions of the ULFA and the NDFB both of which are part of Khaplang-led alliance. When the news of the ambush had trickled in on the morning of June 4, the very first response on my part was to advise our own assets on the ground to be extra vigilant. I also advised the senior officials concerned with the counter-insurgency in Assam, who I am in contact with regularly, to exercise further caution in their routine movements. While both ULFA and NDFB had suffered serious setbacks in recent years, there are still enough cadres and firepower available with them to cause another tragedy.
While crafting a calibrated and effective response to the Manipur ambush, India must categorically accepted that ethnic-militant groups from India's Northeast had always found "sanctuary" in Myanmar, regardless of whether the Burmese Army supported or opposed this. At present, they are mostly holed up in the territory that NSCN (K) exercises control over and it has a formal ceasefire with the Burmese Army. The reason why Burmese Army finds this convenient is that it is one less battlefront for them while they are already engaged in a multi-front ethnic civil war with Myanmar's ethnic minorities such as Kachins, Shans and Was, which have powerful rebel armies that controls a large swathe of the territory. Thus, the Burmese Army has neither the resources nor the necessity to battle NSCN (K), let alone exercise effective administrative control over the Naga-inhabited territory without roads or infrastructure. Armchair strategists and experts in New Delhi need to stop pinning their hopes on the Burmese Army to do anything about this reality on the ground. The "response", thus, has to be crafted without pinning hopes on Naypyidaw.
One of the responses could be a well-planned Special Forces operation to simultaneously strike several of the major rebel camps in the NSCN (K) territory across the international border. Most of these camps are less than 150km from the international border. Their locations are also known. While Naypyidaw may not be entirely pleased, there is little it can do. Myanmar doesn't have any credible air-defence along this border and airborne troops on choppers, protected by gunships can, in fact, carry out such a one-off strike that would put the fear into the insurgents. This won't end the insurgency but will shatter the perception of invulnerability they now enjoy in Myanmar.
The other less dramatic but effective response would be to methodically tighten border controls and make infiltration from Myanmar extremely difficult. At present, the 1643km long Indo-Myanmar border is "unfenced" and the prevalent border regime allows free movement up to 16 kms on either side of the border. This is what makes the border extremely porous and border areas vulnerable to attacks, like the one that took place on June 4. It will take time but sealing-off the border and flushing out militants on our own territory will prove to be an effective strategy, if carried out patiently and sustained for several years at an effective intensity.
While those who have lent active support to militants must be prosecuted, put on trial and convicted, something that rarely happens, what must be meticulously ensured is that there is no harassment or retaliatory violence against civilians during operations. Militants holed up in jungles and inhospitable areas in Myanmar but unable to infiltrate into our territories are not the kind of threats we need to lose sleep over and that will anyway progressively marginalize them.
The lessons never learnt
That the Indian government was caught by surprise by NSCN (K)'s unilateral abrogation of ceasefire and the spate of attacks on Indian forces that followed is evident. This has been the result of a certain mindset that has prevailed over decades in our security establishment. Once an armed insurgent group has come into a ceasefire, and it is somehow coopted into, or believed to have been coopted into, the designs of those running the establishment, the government turns a blind eye to all their unlawful activities. This had proved suicidal on many occasions.
On October 30, 2008, the NDFB carried out one of the worst terror attacks in India when it triggered 11 near simultaneous blasts across five locations in Assam, killing 88 civilians instantly. When it had carried out this terror attack, NDFB was in a ceasefire with the Indian government, with its cadres supposedly restricted to "designated camps" under the watch of our intelligence agencies and security forces. Was the ceasefire withdrawn and NDFB penalised for this? No.
Even while NSCN (IM) has been in ceasefire since 1997 and in "peace talks" with the government, it conspired in May 2009 to purchase and bring into India, illegally, a huge cache of small arms and light weapons worth USD 1.2 million. These arms were to be obtained from the Chinese arms manufacturing giant NORINCO through another company, TCL, which was its authorised representative. It was just fortunate that NIA got wind of this and decided to investigate and prosecute the conspirators. It successfully nabbed Anthony Shimray, self-styled major general and commander, Alee Command (foreign affairs) of NSCN (IM), who is now facing trial lodged in Tihar jail.
Many of the NDFB (S) militants who had carried out several of the brutal massacres of non-Bodos in Assam in 2014 were actually trained by the other factions of the NDFB in ceasefire in their designated camps, under the very nose of intelligence agencies and the security forces.
Such examples are numerous.
The other insidious and very disturbing reality is that all the northeastern militant groups have developed a deep nexus with the political parties, bureaucracy, police forces in the states, and officials within our intelligence and security establishments. That is how an accused in the October 2008 terror attack wanted by the CBI could live under the very nose of the police, army and intelligence agencies, routinely talk with a DGP-rank official on phone, and carry on strike after terror strike in Assam. That NDFB militant leader is G Bidai - the military chief of the Sangbijit faction, which is in alliance with NSCN (K). The CDRs of his mobile phone numbers are an embarrassment to the security agencies.
Similarly in Nagaland, the Superintendent of Police of Wokha district Sejongmong Sangtam, Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) James Ovung, Assistant Sub Inspector (ASI) Longlise Sangtam, and Havaldar Enyhi Chakesang ran a racket that misappropriated at least 7,100 live rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition used in AK series assault rifles from the police armoury and sold it off to NSCN (IM). They have been charged by the NIA and put on trial. What should be taken note of is that this isn't a stray incident.
Give this reality, it is patently absurd that Prime Minister Narendra Modi's high-level task force on the Northeast wants the Army to be pulled out of counter-insurgency deployment in Manipur and Nagaland, and give police in the troubled states the lead role in counter-insurgency operations.
The state police forces' lack of capability, their unholy nexuses with insurgents and the "sympathy" based on ethnic affinity that exists among its officers and personnel would make this a dangerous proposition. This once again reflects the complete lack of understanding of ground realities by the present government and those tasked with drafting critical policy.
Given its "ideological" inclinations, the present government has also exercised disproportionate efforts to find "Islamic Jihadis" even in places where they do not exist. While the minister of state for home, Kiren Rijiju or the joint secretary, Northeast in the ministry of home affairs, Sambhu Singh keep talking of al Qaeda making inroads into Manipur and Northeast, in reality, ordinary civilians and even soldiers continue to get killed by ethnic militants.
Even as recently as February this year, I had once again warned that New Delhi is overlooking the Northeast militants as a credible threat (India's Other War: Jihadi Paranoia and Ethnic Militancy) while being obsessed with Islamic State or the al Qaeda. When the tragedies finally struck, it wasn't any Islamic Jihadis who killed 30 soldiers in quick succession in four incidents in sixty days. It gives me little pleasure that I stand vindicated at the cost of the lives of our soldiers.