Indira Gandhi and the nuclear bomb: She never gave the green signal

“My God, that woman had a will of iron. You talked to her and you realised immediately that she was tough.” (Reedy, 1985)

This was George Reedy, a long-time aide of President Lyndon Johnson reflecting upon a conversation he had had with Indira Gandhi. The possibility of Indira emerging as a long-term Indian leader at the time was not apparent to everyone or perhaps many.

In 1966, at a dinner gathering, some leading newspaper editors and political commentators unanimously considered that “Mrs Gandhi, who had been the head of government for less than three months, would soon be ousted” (Masant, 1976).

She was only the second woman to be the Prime Minister of a country. In her early days in office as minister of information and broadcasting, the note struck by Indira Gandhi with world leaders can be glimpsed from a conversation between her and USSR Council of Ministers' chairman AN Kosygin on October 30, 1964, discussing Indian nuclear capability.

Indira conveyed to Kosygin that “all sorts of pressures were beginning to be felt in India from the situation created by the Chinese nuclear test”.

According to a former naval chief, Indira had issued a "strategic directive’ in 1968 which mentioned (nuclear) submarines. The true submarine was a nuclear submarine and the conventional one was technically a submersible.

Thus, according to the former naval chief, this submarine in the "strategic directive" referred to a nuclear submarine. This also fits well with her secretary PN Haksar’s articulation of a nuclear triad for India in the same year.

In her initial years, Indira’s decision-making seems to have relied substantially on the counsel of PN Haksar.

The stage for Indira’s avatar as a "cold warrior" was set up by Haksar who helped train India’s nuclear weapons ambition with China as the main nuclear threat to India in the long run. In 1968, Haskar wrote that “a nuclear stand-off with China is essential as soon as possible”.

Haksar also wrote that the first test device for India would have to be equal in yield if not more than the one that exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, otherwise it would not have appropriate impact. Eventually, Indira had formed her own independent strategic inclinations which also coincided with the political decision to go ahead with preparations for India’s first nuclear test.

Former Atomic Energy Commission chairperson MR Srinivasan recalled to the author in interviews for the book The Nation Declassified: India and the Cold War World that he had been sounded out on the nuclear explosives programme as early as 1966. Newly unearthed letters between Dr Homi Bhabha and PM Jawaharlal Nehru reveal that Bhabha had established the basic capacities and even doctrinal decision of when to cross the no-bomb line.

Bhabha had written to Nehru that repeated tests and delivery demonstration by China would need to be responded to by India itself acquiring minimum deterrence, since then the question would cease to be merely of psychological posturing and require a military response.

As told to the author by the head of the thermonuclear device team of 1998, the Pokhran tests and also one of the first persons to be recruited for the 1974 explosives project, the team to work on nuclear explosives was formed in 1968 and designs were being worked on.

According to the scientist, “there were earlier attempts but serious work started in 1968”.The same year, as we know from economist Ashok Mitra's private papers, funds were allocated by the Planning Commission for Purnima-I (zero research reactor) that became the basis for the 1974 test. The 1974 device was a deliverable device. As explained in an interview by nuclear scientist Dr Anil Kakodkar, one channel of weaponisation was through the 1974 device.

The year 1968 saw only a rudimentary start with basic calculations. As to how the initial work proceeded, a team member informs that “the work on the implosion system started in 1969”. Nuclear scientist Homi Sethna encouraged Raja Ramanna, the architect of the Indian nuclear bomb, to start work on the explosive device.

Going back to the pre-Pokhran-I timeline and appointment of scientist Vikram Sarabhai by PM Indira Gandhi, engineer-scientist MR Srinivasan said Homi Bhabha had already authorised a small group of Ramanna, PK Iyengar, R Chidambaram and a few others to look at the PNE (peaceful nuclear explosion) but since Bhabha died, Sarabhai played this down, stating that the PNE was not a priority and even asked for some of the papers regarding PNE proposals from Bhabha’s time, kept them with himself and did not bring it up for discussion.

Srinivasan also informs that “one thing is a fact, Vikram Sarabhai was a strong Gandhian and a pacifist and may have had his strong personal reservation (against) the nuclear explosions development”. He adds that events in Bangladesh were escalating at the time of Sarabhai’s appointment in early 1971, the defence ministry had asked for short-range solid fuelled rockets that could send some amounts of explosives across the border.

Sarabhai authorised Thumba scientists to manufacture these rockets and supply these to defence. Srinivasan states that “probably by that time Vikram had undergone a change but a firm push on the nuclear PNE programme was given after Sarabhai, with Homi Sethna taking over the AEC office. Whether zero work was done under Sarabhai or some calculations were done, but perhaps Sarabhai was neutral to the PNE programme at best although one does not know whether he actually said to go slow on PNE”. 

However, Indira Gandhi of the 1980s was careful not to present a hawkish persona to world leaders, at least not immediately on resumption of the PM’s office. She was also hopeful of working out a better understanding with the US and perhaps this might have been the reason that a test was not conducted in 1980-81.

1998 BARC thermonuclear device team member and someone who was also part of 1974 test team told the author that “we really wanted to test in 1980-81 but she never gave the green signal. Work had been completed on a boosted fission device”.

Also read: Sonia Gandhi to Rajdeep Sardesai: No comparison between Modi and Indira