Modi's India-Pakistan formula is a rehash of an old agreement

So India and Pakistan are going to start samagra vaarta! When India's foreign minitster Sushma Swaraj made this disclosure in Islamabad earlier this week, a howl of protests went up from assembled Pakistani journalists because they did not get the klisht or pure Hindi. Swaraj then elaborated in English: "What was being done as composite dialogue, and was later called resumed dialogue, will now be called the comprehensive bilateral dialogue."

The elaboration betrayed the misinformation that is often spread when events are described in different languages. In Hindi she had claimed: "Hum dono deshon ne samagra vaarta prarambh karney ka faisla le liya hai." Anyone with even a meagre knowledge of India's not so "national language" will know that this does not mean what Swaraj elaborated in English. Yet, an impression has been spread that this government has initiated a new dialogue process with Islamabad. Is there any truth in this claim?

Though the story of Indo-Pak dialogue begins in January 1949 when ceasefire was declared between the two countries after the undeclared war of 1948, structured negotiations between the two started in March 1997 when they sat down across the table after a gap of three years. The meeting began in the backdrop of Pakistan foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmed declaring that Kashmir would be the core issue.

But by the end of the meeting he climbed down. Over the next few months, the negotiations were choreographed from the Indian side by IK Gujral, first as foreign minister in the HD Deve Gowda ministry and later as prime minister and conducted in committee rooms by Salman Haider as India's Foreign Secretary. In June 1997, the two nations listed "eight issues" on which dialogue would be restricted.

Probably, this was the most brilliant move made by Indian diplomacy as far as negotiations with Islamabad were concerned. The eight issues listed were:

(a) Peace and security, including Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

(b) Jammu and Kashmir

(c) Siachen

(d) Wullar Barrage Project / Tulbul Navigation Project

(e) Sir Creek

(f) Terrorism and drug-trafficking

(g) Economic and Commercial Cooperation

(h) Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields.

In one stroke, the June 1997 agreement equated Jammu and Kashmir with peace, security, terrorism and drug trafficking - all major Indian concerns that Pakistan didn't wish to talk about.

The fact that the eight issues - formally named composite dialogue process was carried on by the Vajpayee regime and the UPA government till the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack demonstrates how the crafty move kept Pakistan diplomacy on a leash and did not allow them the liberty to declare "no talks unless Kashmir was given primacy".

No single "core issue" remained as every issue was the central part. The Mumbai terror attack put the composite dialogue process in cold storage till 2011 and even though for some quaint reason it is now referred as resumed dialogue, the basic tenet of simultaneously talking about the eight issues was followed.

The Modi's government's Pakistan policy has been flawed for two reasons. Firstly, there have been conflicting signals from the top regarding when to blow hot and when to blow cold.

Secondly, fault lines within government at the top have often sought to apportion blame on Sushma Swaraj for being belligerent when it was necessary to have a nuanced stance and vice versa. Prime Minister Narendra Modi appears to have taken the bull by its horns and the Paris guftagu with Nawaz Sharif followed by the Bangkok meets of the two national security advisers without prior public - and maybe even private - disclosure, point to the fact that at this point he wishes to soften his posture.

But why call it a new process? After all, the points listed in Islamabad in the joint statement are no different. The twelve issues on which comprehensive bilateral dialogue will he conducted are:

Peace & Security; CBMs (these two points are in fact split from the first issue listed in 1997); Jammu and Kashmir; Siachen; Sir Creek; Wullar Barrage; economic and commercial cooperation; counter-terrorism (worded differently from the 1997 agreement but meaning the same); narcotics control (also worded differently from the 1997 agreement); humanitarian Issues (new issue but hardly a contentious matter that holds up resumption of negotiations) ; people to people exchanges (also worded differently from the 1997 agreement); and religious tourism (almost the same as the previous point but understandable given the Indian government's emphasis on matters religious!).

The process too is likely to be the same - foreign secretaries will meet and then each issue will be tackled by sub-groups like before. Eventually if there is progress, talks will be elevated to the foreign minister level and then eventually to a summit level.

If there is no repeat of events that marred the progress of talks previously, Modi will have a crowning glory well in time for the next parliamentary polls. On the other hand, if fresh terror strikes occur, things will be back to square one. For the moment, the immediate need is to resume dialogue because it will be tough for Modi to visit Pakistan for the SAARC Summit next year if hostility continues.

After all, Modi would like to declare from Pakistani soil that he is the first prime minister to visit the country after more than a decade (Manmohan Singh never visited Pakistan during his tenure) like he has done from various quaint ports of halt he has made. If for fulfilling this ambition, it will have to old wine in new bottle or a rehash of an old agreement, so be it!