How Paris attacks, Bangkok meet and Heart of Asia are connected

In the world of international strategic affairs, events move so quickly that it is sometimes impossible to keep pace. Even if you do move at that pace, joining the dots of what is upfront may still be simpler, what’s behind the scenes emerges much later.

Given this broad understanding, how does one link three supposedly disparate events — the Paris terror attacks, the Bangkok meeting of the Indian and Pakistan National Security Advisers (NSA), and the ongoing Heart of Asia Conference at Islamabad which is a part of the Istanbul Process.

The Paris terror attacks have awakened the world to the potential of Daesh (ISIS) taking the war to Europe and perhaps to America; the rush of refugees and displaced people from Syria is adding to the perception of worry; and transnational terror is at the top of the list of international security concerns.

The West is also worried that Daesh is spreading its influence into Afghanistan. Even more worried are Russia and the Central Asian Republics which lie north of Afghanistan, the natural expansion space for Daesh.

Instability

This expansion will provide Daesh more financial muscle from the illegal narcotics trade and spread the spectre of terror into a wider arc, besides giving it stamina. The Afghanistan-Pakistan area is already unstable with potential for more instability. The West is looking for ways of defeating Daesh in the Middle East, stabilising Syria to prevent flow of refugees and control its surrogates in Africa. It does not want any expansion of Daesh into Afghanistan because that will only expand the area of contact.

In simple terms, here lies the linkage between the Paris attacks and the Heart of Asia Conference being held in Islamabad. The latter was a scheduled event under the Istanbul Process which dates back to November 2011 and empowers 14 core regional nations around Afghanistan to institutionally engage for a peaceful and stable Afghanistan, as well as a secure and prosperous region as a whole. This is the fourth conference under its aegis and coincidentally comes at a time when it is needed most given what the emerging situation in Afghanistan is. That too may be necessary to outline in a little detail.

US President Barack Obama was forced to go back on the original decision of full and final withdrawal from Afghanistan by deciding to remain flexible, contingent upon the situation. The situation hasn’t been good at all ever since President Ashraf Ghani decided to dump India and go all the way with Pakistan and China.

That strategy came a cropper as the Taliban did not hold back their summer offensive of 2015 which led to pitched battles with the Afghan National Army (ANA); the ANA has reportedly suffered 8,000 dead and wounded.

Strategy

With its poor state of military hardware, Afghanistan is under intense pressure for future operations. Ghani's change of strategy was maturely handled by India's diplomatic establishment.

The Afghan government is back to looking up to India for greater support and the message coming out of China is that it does not have a strategy in place. The Taliban are divided after the announcement of Mulla Omar's death and no one is sure whether his successor, Mulla Manzour, is alive or not.

Afghan economy needs an infusion of capital, otherwise we may find a state collapse which will have far-reaching consequences comparable with Syria. Given the tenuous situation and the efforts to stabilise the region, even as the Middle East remains in the throes of a crisis greater than it has ever faced before, it was important for the US to encourage the creation of a conducive environment to visibly move forward on Afghanistan.

I do not subscribe to conjecture of American pressure on the government of India to stabilise its relationship with Pakistan. Yet, it may not be wrong to presume that there has been gentle nudging or urging.

First, the positive. India’s importance at the high table for stabilisation of Afghanistan has been restored and well recognised. However, to give that an impetus, it is probably perceived that the niggles which trouble the India-Pakistan relationship should at least be placed on the back-burner in the current environment bedeviling the world at large.

But what has changed between September 2015 and December 2015 to conducively hold the dialogue?

I believe that the post-Paris attacks environment is being perceived as singularly dangerous. India’s role in Afghanistan is being considered important; it can play that role effectively provided it is not under intense pressure from its persisting negative relationship with Pakistan. Win-win is perhaps too strong a term; more likely is the realisation that movement in their mutual relationship would probably help create a better environment for the region under the current circumstances.

General Raheel Sharif’s visit to the US must have been used to convey the nudges to Pakistan.

Breakthrough

What else has changed which allowed a tactical (not strategic) breakthrough? The red lines of the Hurriyat’s presence were deftly met by moving the venue away from the subcontinent. The appointment of Lt Gen Naseer Janjua as the Pakistan NSA has helped because the NSA talks are security-oriented.

The third issue is the inclusion of Jammu & Kashmir in the agenda, but from a security and not political angle. It met the broad requirements of both sides with the Indian side at some risk of domestic criticism. Given the situation, the events in Bangkok are merely tactical in nature. They have enabled the visit of External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj to Islamabad.

To expect any major fallout or concession by either side at the parleys on the sidelines would be unrealistic. She must exploit the opportunity to reiterate India’s concerns on terror and the key demands regarding 26/11.

However, considering the larger game plan it is India’s enhanced role in Afghanistan which must be clearly sought and secured. That is where the focus must be.