Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy sent by the British government to India might be despised by some for drawing the partition lines in India. However, if we flip back the pages of history, we will understand how an ‘unworkable proposition’ such as Pakistan, proposed by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, came into existence.
The division of India was not in sight until 1946 even though Pakistan’s founder and President of Muslim League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah wanted it at any cost.
Post World War 2, the dynamics changed and the British government wanted to transfer the power to Indian government as soon as possible. It had pressure from the West, especially the US, to free India.
The viceroys who were sent to India were unable to resolve the communal issue. At one point, Lord Wavell, who was the Viceroy to India from 1944 to 1947, was so incensed with talks with different stakeholders of Muslim League and the Congress that he said, “The more I see of these Indian politicians, the more I despair of India.”
He had developed bitter relations with Mohandas Gandhi and Jinnah by 1947. Jinnah had also lost faith in the British government after it went back on its promises regarding the interim government formation.
The interim government formation in 1946 turned out to be a ‘Pyrrhic victory’ for Lord Wavell and upon its failure, he soon resigned and went back to London and Lord Mountbatten came to replace him.
Lord Mountbatten had come with a motive to resolve the Indian communal issue. He had come with an intention to bring the Muslim League and Congress party on a common platform over the Cabinet Mission plan. But little did he know that he was going for one of the toughest tasks in his life, which was to convince Mohammad Ali Jinnah to give up on his dreams of Pakistan.
Lord Mountbatten had met Gandhi upon his arrival and was told that Jinnah can head the interim government formation. This proposal was astounding for Mountbatten even though he presented it to Jinnah, who outrightly rejected it.
However, Mountbatten soon realised that Jinnah was a hard nut to crack and with the hostile environment with communal riots taking place every day, partition was inevitable.
Lord Mountbatten was never a fond admirer of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and at one point was so angry with his obstinacy, that he called him a ‘psychopathic case’. He said, “Mr Jinnah had not been able in his presence to adduce one single feasible argument in favour of Pakistan. In fact, he had offered no counter arguments. He gave the impression that he was not listening. He was impossible to argue with.”
Over Jinnah’s demand for Pakistan, Mountbatten had said, “He gives me the impression of a man who has not thought out one single piece of mechanics of his own great scheme, and he will have the shock of his life when he really has to come down to earth and try and make his vague idealistic proposals work on a concrete basis.”
On May 19, 1947, Mountbatten informed British Prime Minister Clement Atlee and his Cabinet colleagues that “the Muslim League would resort to arms if Pakistan in some form were not conceded”.
On the other hand, Nehru was sick of arguing and he put in privately to concede Pakistan on the theory that by “cutting off the head we will get rid of the headache”.
Therefore, dividing the country into two parts was the only option Lord Mountbatten was left with.
Jinnah being the President of the Muslim League had always defended his call for an independent state for the Muslims. He had become so embittered by the Congress that he felt that an independent state for Muslims was the only solution.
Stanley Wolpert in his biography of Jinnah, 'Jinnah of Pakistan' quotes the leader, “On both sides, in Hindustan and Pakistan, there are sections of people who may not agree with it, who may not like it, but in my judgement there was no solution and I am sure future history will record its verdict in favour of it. And what is more it will be proved by actual experience as we go on that that was the only solution. Any idea of a united India could never have worked and in my judgement it would have led us to terrific disaster. May be that view is correct, may be it is not; that remains to be seen.”