While Beijing builds in South China Sea, India dithers over its own

On July 14, the International Court of Justice slapped down Beijing’s claim over the South China Sea (SCS).

The Hague ruled that China’s nine-dash line and accompanying claims to historic rights had no validity under international law.

China responded with bluster, announcing a new round of military drills in the disputed sea and a July 18 statement by the PLA commander that his country would continue to build up military facilities there.  

China has, over the past two years, reclaimed 3,000 acres of land, and built airstrips on them, some capable of landing fighter aircraft, all of which the court ruled were not islands under the United Nations Conventions on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

There are multiple reasons for China creating what the US Navy calls "Great Wall of Sand", not the least of which is the fact that SCS is rich in oil and natural gas.

Securing the SCS is part of Beijing’s strategy of bolstering the "first island chain" as first enunciated in its "active defence" maritime doctrine of 1985 where it saw the imaginary line running through the Kurile islands, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia as its primary line of defence from a seaborne invasion.

This chain spans the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and the South China Sea. Another important reason is to defend China’s strategic jewel, Hainan island in the SCS.

A naval base here houses its South Sea Fleet and its growing fleet of nuclear submarines.

Beginning in December 2013, it has sent conventional and nuclear submarines from its South Sea Fleet on long patrols into the Indian Ocean, the first of them in December 2013.

India, meanwhile, continues the astonishing neglect of its strategic island territories on its south-western and south-eastern flanks.

These unsinkable aircraft carriers could be springboards for surveillance, anti-submarine warfare and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) roles through the Indian Ocean region. 

But they are presently nothing more than tourist destinations with sandy beaches and diving spots.

The neglect of the island territories, however, is in sharp contrast to the defence ministry’s vision for the Indo-Pacific where it is partnering the US.

The India-US joint statement released on April 12 this year during US defence secretary Ashton Carter’s visit to New Delhi says that both US and Indian navies will improve data sharing on commercial shipping traffic, and begin navy-to-navy discussions on submarine safety and anti-submarine warfare. 

On June 10, Prime Minister Modi told the joint houses of US Congress that India was assuming her responsibilities in securing the Indian Ocean region, and that a strong India-US partnership could anchor peace, prosperity and stability from Asia to Africa and from Indian Ocean to the Pacific.

The partnership would help ensure security of the sea lanes of commerce and freedom of navigation on seas, Prime Minister Modi said.

India’s eastern outpost, the Andaman and Nicobar islands, are located near the entrance to the world’s most important waterway, the Malacca Strait.

Nearly five trillion dollars worth of global commerce transits these straits each year.

The island chain is closer to five vital ASEAN countries than it is to the Indian mainland.

Engaging this grouping of Southeast Asian countries has been a vital aspect of India’s Act East policy over the past 20 years.

Yet, the enormous potential of these islands is unrealised.

The islands are served by a handful of IAF Mi-17 medium transport helicopters, Coast Guard Dornier maritime patrol aircraft, patrol vessels and an amphibious brigade comprising 3,000 soldiers.

The islands lack the radar coverage for India to be even able to monitor civilian traffic, leave alone declare an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) as China is contemplating over the SCS.

When Malaysian authorities sought information from India on its MH370 airliner which disappeared on March 8, 2014, it caused considerable embarrassment in New Delhi which discovered that its aging radars on the island were switched off.

Plans to ramp up the military presence on some of these 572 islands have not borne fruit possibly because the tri-services Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) formed in 2001 remains a non-starter.

With the government yet to appoint a tri-services chief - a permanent chairman chiefs of staff who would drive synergy - ANC remains a low priority area for the armed forces.

The importance of the Bay of Bengal (BoB) to India’s second strike capability, or the ability to launch a nuclear attack in case the adversary launches a first strike, cannot be understated.

The BoB is the future patrol area for India’s four "Arihant" class ballistic missile submarines armed with the 5,000-km range "K5" submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).

The average depth of 2,600 metres in the BoB offers an excellent operational area for submarines, and also the reason why hunting enemy strategic submarines in these waters using warships will have severe limitations.

Modern submarines carry cruise missiles with ranges in far excess of the sensory ranges of warships.

Nearly a decade ago, the Indian Navy proposed a massive strategic Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) plan, a grid comprising underwater listening posts, nuclear-powered attack submarines and shore-based ASW aircraft to track and hunt hostile undersea vessels.

The ANC could become a pivot of this ASW strategy because aircraft based here can cover all three entry points into the Indian Ocean - the Ombai Wetar Strait, Lombok Strait and Malacca Straits.

The disregard of the island territories is equally pronounced in the Arabian Sea.

One of the most important Arabian Sea waterways is the nine-degree channel between the Lakshadweep islands.

More than 40 supertankers headed for China and Japan transit each day through this 200-km channel between the Lakshadweep islands of Kalpeni, Suheli Par and the Maliku Atoll.

The islands lack either radars or long-legged airborne assets to continuously monitor the seas around them. The sole runway in Lakshadweep’s Agatti island is restricted to operating ATR-type medium range turboprops.

This means the only military aircraft which can operate from here are the short- legged Dornier 228.

A proposal to extend Agatti’s runway to allow it to operate 737s has been stalled for environmental reasons.

An extended runway will allow the navy to refuel and stage through P-8I Poseidon long-range maritime patrol/ strike aircraft, presently based in Arakonam, Tamil Nadu.

A P-8I (a military version of the Boeing 737 airliner) based in Agatti can fly surveillance missions across the whole of the Indian Ocean upto South Africa.

Even low-cost options like tethered radar balloons which can give a coverage of around 300 nautical miles, have not been considered.

Navies uses the term "sea blindness" to describe the neglect of a country’s maritime dimension. India’s island-blindness demands urgent attention and action.