What the death of Taliban chief means for Pakistan
If the drone strike carried out in the Balochistan province of Pakistan has indeed despatched the Taliban Emir-ul-Momineen (Leader of the Faithful) Mullah Akhtar Mansour to meet his Maker, then the implications of this development are quite significant.
Quite asides the fact that this would have been the first time that US drones have hit a target outside the tribal areas and the frontier regions of Pakistan, its impact on US-Pakistan relations, Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, Taliban-Pakistan relations, and of course, on the internal dynamics within the Taliban, will determine the future course of events in the AfPak region.
There are broadly two possibilities about how Mansour got hit. The first is that the Americans got information on Mansour and without bothering about diplomatic niceties, Pakistani sensitivities, or even the consequences, took the shot; the second is that the Pakistanis were in the loop, or more sinisterly, that they set up the loop, to get rid of the Taliban chief who was becoming a tad too inconvenient, and worse, a little too independent.
Assuming that the Pakistanis were blindsided in Mansour's killing, it will cause deep embarrassment to Pakistan's military establishment which, after the Abbottabad operation to kill Osama bin Laden, was once again caught off-guard by US taking out a high value target inside Pakistan. This is bound to impact on US-Pakistan relations, which could go into a tailspin.
 |
| For Pakistan, Mansour's loss doesn't necessarily mean the loss of control over the Taliban. (Reuters) |
Worse, it will constitute a big setback to Pakistan's grand strategic plan for Afghanistan on which it has staked so much.
The second possibility is that Pakistan was very much in on Mansour's killing. The Pakistanis will, of course, go blue in the face denying that they had anything to do with the drone strike.
For good measure, they will also condemn it and lodge a strong protest. But such treachery, even though it exposes the embarrassing reality of the Taliban chief's presence inside Pakistan, isn't past the Pakistanis for whom Mansour was becoming a liability.
Sacrificing him could yield more to Pakistan than sticking with him.
Over the past few months, US-Pakistan relations have been going downhill.
The aid blockage by the US Congress is a manifestation of the trajectory in which the relationship was moving. The Afghan government was meanwhile bristling at Pakistan reneging on pledges made at the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG).
The failure of the QCG (which includes China) to push the peace process forward meant that diplomatic efforts to settle Afghanistan had reached a dead end, which in turn meant that the violence would intensify and could spill over into Pakistan.
With the security situation in the region deteriorating, the ambitious China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on which Pakistan has staked its entire future, could be adversely affected.
There are reasons to believe that even the Chinese were leaning on the Pakistanis to start delivering on Afghanistan. And then there were all the new strategic alignments in the region, not the least of which was the forthcoming visit of the Indian prime minister, first to Iran to firm up the Chabahar project, and later to the US to give a push to the strategic partnership. Clearly, the Pakistanis needed to rethink their Afghan gambit.
By helping the Americans take out Mansour, the Pakistanis would have delivered a big prize and in return would get the goodies they wanted from the US.
It would also help them reach out to the Afghans. But most importantly, Mansour was expendable for Pakistan. His loss doesn't necessarily mean the loss of control over the Taliban.
Having snuffed out challenges to Mansour from within Taliban ranks, and having managed to manoeuvre their favourite Sirajuddin Haqqani as Mansour's military chief, the Pakistanis had firmed up their control over the Taliban.
With Mansour dead, the Pakistanis will try to get their man - either Sirajuddin or Mullah Omar's son or even someone else - accepted as the Taliban Emir.
To be sure, some Taliban commanders will rebel. But given the firepower of the Haqqanis, coupled with efforts of the Afghan army and the Americans, these elements can be put out of business.
And once this is done, the "reconciliation" drama can recommence with the Pakistanis and their proxies plugging for their demands to be accepted.
While the Pakistanis might have played a high risk but calculated gamble, Afghanistan has a bad habit of pulling nasty surprises on even the most carefully calculated and calibrated plans.
Even if the Taliban was to accept a Pakistani proxy as their Emir, will he continue to dance to Pakistan's tune and also play ball with the Americans and the Afghan government?
Won't the new Emir have to establish his jihadi credentials just as Mansour had? If so, then the situation will get much worse before it gets better, if at all.
Of course, if there is another power grab within the Taliban ranks, it will give the Afghan government an opportunity to degrade the Taliban movement.
While it is good riddance, Mansour's death alone isn't going to pave the path for any immediate "reconciliation" in Afghanistan. It could in fact make the battle lines more chaotic.
Even so, the Americans have struck a welcome blow and more such blows need to be delivered on Taliban and their affiliates for a political settlement in Afghanistan to have any chance of succeeding.
(Courtesy of Mail Today.)