Stop fearmongering about Indian Muslims
I read with horror recent op-eds about how Indian Muslims are being pushed "over the edge", or how Indian secularism is now barely hanging on by a thread. These articles, however well-meaning, are a form of reckless fearmongering based on an unclear understanding of both Indian secularism and how deeply Indian Muslims are enmeshed in the Indian project - secularism and all.
The murder of minorities is a "secular" project
Many of the concerns stem from the recent "beef politics" and the divisive speeches unleashed under the current government. But here is the thing, the murder of minorities has been a central part of Indian politics - and it is a "secular" project, as in every community has taken part in it. As Steven Wilkinson's excellently researched book, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India ably demonstrated, political violence in India has primarily been a vehicle to consolidate vote share during close electoral contests. By the basic rule of numbers, voter consolidation works only in favour of the numerical larger community; therefore "ethnic riots" in India have been targeted against minority communities.
In some cases this has included Sikh victims (in the 1984 anti-Sikh pogroms), the Hindu community (in Sikh-dominated Punjab in the 1980s and in the Muslim-dominated Kashmir Valley in the late 1980s and early 1990s) and the Christian community, most prominently in the 2007 Kandhmal violence in the state of Orissa.
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| Indian Muslims are largely missing from militancy both outside and within India. (AP) |
Of course, the principal victims of most major riots in India have been Muslims for the simple reason that they are the most generally available minority group. These include the Nellie massacre in 1983, the Bhagalpur riot in 1989, the Bombay riots of 1992-93, and the Gujarat riots of 2002, each of which include hundreds, if not thousands of Indian Muslims being killed as police stood by, or actively participated.
The perpetrators have not only been able to get away with their crimes, in most of these cases politicians responsible for instigating these riots have won high political office. Lal Krishna Advani, who forcefully campaigned for the demolition of the Babri Masjid, went on to become the deputy prime minister and minister of home affairs of India.
His movement was directly linked to the 1992 riots in Bombay, in which his political ally, Bal Thackeray, was indicted by the Srikrishna Commission. Thackeray continued to be a powerful political figure despite being banned from contesting elections for a period of six years, and upon his death he was given a state funeral, like Gandhi, though for perpetuating mass murder, not opposing it.
Narendra Modi, India's current prime minister, was the chief minister of Gujarat when the 2002 riots took place, and a key organiser of Advani's political agitation. He famously appointed Maya Kodnani, indicted for conspiracy to murder of 97 Indians, as his minister in charge of women and child development until she was forced to quit upon her conviction on the charges. Upon winning the 2014 General Elections, Modi appointed Sanjeev Balyan, a key accused in the September 2013 Muzzafarnagar riots, in which dozens were killed and tens of thousands were displaced, as a cabinet minister.
Missing from militancy
Despite all of this, Indian Muslims are largely missing from militancy both outside and within India. Indian Muslims number around 180 million, or about 11 per cent of the global Muslim population, more than that of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq combined, yet Indians are missing from al Qaeda and ISIS. The only Indian connection to al Qaeda was the announcement of Asim Umar heading its south Asia wing in September 2014.
One news report claimed that he may be of Indian origin, although all the information on him in the public domain indicates that whatever activity he may have undertaken, happened in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He is said to have written four books, and made a few speeches. There is no militant activity associated with him.
ISIS has no Indian commanders, and very few recruits from India, as one commentator recently put it, "The figures for Indians joining the IS are low enough to be statistically negligible (less than 0.00004 per cent) compared to the rest of the world." This is while countries as tiny as Ireland and Finland, with populations less than 0.4 percent of India's have contributed more fighters to ISIS than India. Even taking for granted that these recruits come overwhelmingly from immigrant , it does not explain why Indian Muslim immigrants have not been involved in any attack by al Qaeda or ISIS in the Middle East, South Asia or in the developed countries, with one exception.
Indian Muslims are also largely missing from militant networks within India. Neither the longest-running insurgencies in the Northeastern states of India, nor the ultra Leftist Maoist groups, which at one point operated in as many as one-third of the districts of India, have had any Muslim leaders. The only militancy in which Muslims are well represented is in the Kashmir Valley, which happens to be over 97 per cent Muslim in 1989 when the militancy started. (All the Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir combined represent about four percent of the Indian Muslim population.) There have been also, individual terrorist attacks in India, most gruesomely the coordinated attacks on the city of Bombay in November 2008.
All such attacks involve at least some complicity by Indian Muslims, and yet these acts of terrorism remain locked into the politics of India, not connecting - like their Pakistani, Indonesian, Filipino, Egyptian, or other counterparts - to global militant networks.
Explaining a negative
Despite immense provocations, and large numbers, Indian Muslims have steadfastly refused to take the path of militancy. This is because India is unique in three very significant ways which undercut the appeal of global militancy as a response. These are (i) a plural public space and history, (ii) no military rule, and (iii) a strongly independent foreign policy.
Unlike other post-colonial movements, the Indian independence movement was a visibly diverse one. The first major public political campaign that Gandhi led was the Non-Cooperation Movement in 1920. A very important part of the campaign was the Khilafat (Caliphate) Movement, thus the first major mobilisation by Indians against British rule began with a call to retain the Islamic Caliphate. The major organisations - the Muslim League and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) - who opposed this diversity were marginal to the Indian independence movement. This has meant that for the last 60 plus years most Indians have been taught a worldview that accepts diversity.
The acts of important public figures have reinforced this view. While specific politicians may have promoted sectarian violence, their principal opponents have been, more often than not, their co-religionists. While LK Advani may have sparked off the violence of 1992, but he was arrested by Lalu Prasad Yadav, a politician who also happens to be Hindu. Justice Srikrishna, who indicted Bal Thackeray for promoting sectarian violence in Bombay in 1992, was also a devout Hindu. Justice Jyotsna Yagnik, the judge who sentenced Maya Kodnani to 28 years in jail for the conspiracy to murder 97 people during the 2002 Gujarat riots, is also a Hindu. Teesta Setalvad, who has provided key legal support in the 1992 riots and the 2002 riots to bring the perpetrators to justice, is also a Hindu. Pluralism exists not just as a theoretical concept but as a living reality that speaks directly to the Indian public in which the welfare of Indian Muslims is seen as a central part of the welfare of the nation.
The missing military
India, unlike every other post-colonial country, has the distinction of having avoided military rule. Unlike conflict-prone areas like Afghanistan, or even Pakistan, Nepal or Sri Lanka, the ability of armed non-State actors to affect political change is limited, only possible in certain conflict-hit areas, which have become progressively smaller over the last few decades.
In Pakistan and Bangladesh, where the military cultivated sectarian parties during the time of their rule, sections of the public to look outside the political sphere - to religion or military rule - to gain legitimacy at the price of public debate and discussion. It also legitimised the use of political violence in the name of Islam, in a way that did not happen in India, with the exception of the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. As military rule has receded in both Pakistan and Bangladesh, these parties have either had to transform into democratic actors or been further marginalised. In India, the situation has never arisen.
The unanticipated gains of non-alignment
Another factor is that India has also pursued a markedly independent foreign policy. Nehru's India was part of the non-alignment movement (NAM) along with Tito's Yugoslavia and Nasser's Egypt, but Egypt aligned with the US, and Yugoslavia fell apart. Although India tacked closer to the Soviet Union than to the US during the Cold War, it maintained an almost fetishist attachment to an independent foreign policy. This means that al Qaeda's idea of attacking the "far enemy" (the United States) to weaken the "near enemy" (Arab regimes supported by the US) makes no sense in the Indian context.
As has often been said, all politics is local. It is difficult to mobilise somebody to act for a political goal if you are not able to convince them of a chance in their local conditions. Al Qaeda and ISIS may enthuse people from Arab states around them, or recruit disgruntled young men from European states that want a way to somehow strike back against societies that they feel resentful against, but a disgruntled Indian Muslim would gain nothing. Only the most outlandish conspiracy theory would convince an Indian that the US or European and Arab states involved in the conflict with ISIS are responsible for his or her problems.
India's home-grown militants
Not that India is immune from Muslim militancy. In March 1993, coordinated bomb blasts in Bombay led to the death of more than 250 people. These bombings were, allegedly, in response to the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992, and the riots that followed in Bombay on through early 1993. The demolition of the mosque also led to the radicalisation of the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and numerous other organisations such as Al Ummah, in South India.
Stephen Tankel's study of the Indian Mujahideen is probably the best study of the organisation. Tankel defines why the issues that relate to the radicalisation of the Indian Mujahideen are truly local phenomena, and thus are unlikely to have an effect beyond the region.
"Ultimately, the issue of Indian jihadism is not a major threat to regional stability or India's rise. Rather, it is a symptom of certain factors: a bilateral relationship with Pakistan that remains defined by zero-sum competition, and poor internal governance, political malfeasance, economic inequality, and widespread sense of injustice. As one former official acknowledged, "These problems would still be here even if we had no terrorism." Another, a former police officer concurred, adding, "Pakistan may be taking advantage of the situation to radicalise Muslim boys. They may even be controlling the IM. But even if they are then so what? We still must look within as to why Indians are susceptible. And it's up to us to solve this problem here."
Looking ahead
The Indian Muslim community has stayed away from militancy largely for the same reasons that most Indians have shunned militancy - it does not work, and liberal democracy is a (proven) better option. The only places where militancy has thrived in India (in the Northeast, in Maoist areas, in Kashmir) is where we have undermined liberal democratic principles wholesale.
The only way Indian Muslims will be "pushed over the edge" is if we do the same for all of India, creating a civil war. And here is the answer for those living in fear - liberal democracy matters. All Indians - whether Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Christians, Jews, Parsis, atheists, whatever - have built this house we call India.
All of us are threatened when its foundations are threatened, no one community more, no one community less, so can we forget the fearmongering and please just get on with building a country that creates the best future for all of us, regardless of caste, creed, gender, or other identity, as the Constitution promises, please?