In the chessboard of geopolitics in Asia, the India-Japan relationship is becoming increasingly important. Japan has always been a significant economic partner of India, but not a strategic one. Now, both on the economic and strategic fronts, the India-Japan relationship is being transformed, as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to India from December 11-13 has further underscored.
The nuclear agreement signed by Narendra Modi and Abe is the most important outcome of the visit from the strategic viewpoint. Even after the India-US nuclear deal, the NSG exemption accorded to India, the normalisation of India's ties with Canada and Australia, Japan has dragged its feet on the nuclear question. When Modi visited Japan in September 2014 and Abe came as chief guest at our 2015 Republic Day celebrations, despite expectations, the nuclear knot could not be untied. The failure to do so again would have been strategically deflating.
Agreement
This time the two prime ministers have sealed the deal. Its text has been negotiated and issues of concern to Japan have been resolved within the template of similar agreements negotiated by us with the US, Canada and Australia. The legal and technical work that remains to be done essentially relates to Japan's internal procedures and local considerations of political timing.
Elements of the Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions signed with the US in 2014 are propelling our understandings with Japan. Disregarding Chinese sensitivities in view of its policies in our neighbourhood that ignore our concerns, we have further underscored quite robustly during Abe's visit that peace, stability and development in the India-Pacific region are indispensable to our national security and prosperity, and that close cooperation between Japan and India is the key to achieving it.
With China's challenge in the East and South China Seas in mind, Modi and Abe have underscored certain principles: the importance of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, peaceful resolution of disputes without use or threat of use of force, freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded lawful commerce in international waters. Modi and Abe have called upon all states to avoid unilateral actions in the South China Sea that could lead to tensions in the region.
We have signed two foundational defence-related agreements, one relating to the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology and the other on Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information. Given Japan's cautious defence policies and internal political discomfort with constitutional changes initiated by Abe to permit a more expansive Japanese role in defence matters, these agreements with India are politically significant, even if actual progress in defence technology cooperation, co-development and coproduction is likely to be slow. In the immediate, India has to take a decision on the US-2 amphibian aircraft being offered by Japan.
Defence
As part of expanding India-Japan defence ties, Japan will now participate regularly in the India-US Malabar exercises in order to "help create stronger capabilities to deal with maritime challenges in the Indo-Pacific region" - a candidly expressed rationale for this decision. The full utilisation of "2+2 dialogue", defence policy dialogue, air force-to-air force talks and coastguard-to-coastguard cooperation is envisaged.
The trilateral dialogues mentioned in the US-India Joint Vision document are taking shape with the trilateral Japan-India-US dialogue at foreign ministers' level in September this year and the inaugural Japan-India-Australia dialogue at secretary-level, both seen as part of a stable security architecture in the India-Pacific region. Other important political deliverables from the Abe visit are full Japanese endorsement of our position on terrorism and Japanese support for our membership of the four export control regimes.
Economy
On the economic side, the great potential of the India-Japan partnership in areas of infrastructure, manufacturing and high technology, including advanced transportation systems, civil nuclear energy, solar power generation, space, biotechnology, rare earths and advanced materials, has been noted during Abe's visit. Both sides are seeking a synergy between India's "Act East" policy and Japan's "partnership for quality infrastructure", that could help develop connectivity within India and regionally. In this context, the path-breaking memorandum of cooperation on the hi-speed Shinkansen rail system between Mumbai and Ahmedabad to be financed with a highly concessional yen loan has been signed. Japan will create a $12bn-facility to support Japanese companies investing in India to further our Make in India objective. The two sides are looking at 13 big infrastructure projects to be financed by ODA loans such as Metro projects both in Chennai and Ahmedabad and road network connectivity in our Northeastern states.
Besides this, there is an understanding that 10,000 Indians would be visiting Japan as students and trainees in the next five years. India has decided that Japanese visitors in all categories would get visas on arrival from March 2016, the first country to be offered this facility. Abe has appreciated the creation of "core group" chaired by cabinet secretary to ensure that investments from Japan as envisaged in the India-Japan investment promotion partnership are facilitated.
All in all, the great potential of the India-Japan relationship is being realised, with India playing its strategic cards with greater self-confidence and clarity and building a more favourable balance for itself in its external relations.