How Beijing will react as court rejects South China Sea claims
Having successfully lulled much of ASEAN (and much of India, for that matter) into complacency with its seductive siren song of a peaceful rise, China — responding to the submissions to the UN by Malaysia and Vietnam in respect of their continental shelves — suddenly precipitated matters by a formal submission to the UN on May 7, 2009 claiming some 90 per cent of the South China Sea (SCS) as its own, through the now famous "nine-dash line".
Although a map depicting this "nine-dash line" had been in existence since 1948, the audacity with which it was dusted off and used to proffer a "historical claim" by Beijing put the Chinese cat firmly amongst the ASEAN pigeons.
While several ASEAN states chose to either acquiesce or remain extremely circumspect, the Philippines and Vietnam have consistently adopted robust positions in opposing China’s moves of creeping jurisdiction within the SCS.
While geopolitical tensions between the Philippines and China are high over ownership of the Johnson South Reef (also claimed by Brunei, Taiwan, and Vietnam) in the Spratly Islands, the most immediate point of confrontation with China has involved the ring-shaped coral reef called Scarborough Shoal, which Philippines calls Bajo de Masinloc.
Located 124 nautical miles (nm) west of Luzon Island but as much as 472 nm from China, it lies well within the 200 nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines island of Luzon.
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| Map of South China Sea, showing competing claims, including China's. (Source: UNCLOS and CIA.) |
The Philippine position is that Scarborough Shoal is an integral part of Philippine territory. China, on the other hand, which wrested physical control over the reef in 2012, asserts that it has a historical claim of the shoal, claiming that it was discovered by the Yuan Dynasty and that it is, moreover, part of its traditional fishing waters.
There is real concern that this might well be the eighth reef subjected to Chinese "terraforming".
In January, 2013, the Philippines, holding that China’s "nine-dash line" was completely illegal, took the issue to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague.
China strenuously opposed the move, opining that the court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the case since the issues raised in the Philippines could not be considered without determining sovereignty, which the tribunal was not empowered to do.
It categorically stated that it would not participate and would not accept any ruling of the court.
However, eight months later, having considered all relevant arguments, the PCA ruled that it did, indeed, have jurisdiction over the matter.
This ruling notwithstanding, China remained obdurate, stating that "By unilaterally initiating the arbitration, the Philippine side is imposing its own will on others... It is only natural for China not to participate in such arbitration that has become tainted and gone astray. And China will not accept or recognize the award of the arbitration, whatever it might be."
On July 12, 2016, in an anxiously awaited but widely expected verdict, the PCA not only ruled overwhelmingly in favour of the Philippines, but far more damagingly for China, it scathingly removed the fig-leaf of "historical" control that had been so brazenly worn by China.
The PCA has categorically ruled that China’s "nine-dash line" is devoid of legal merit.
Where does all this leave the People’s Republic?
On the one hand, China has remained consistent in its rejection of the jurisdictional competence of the PCA on this subject, insisting that the only solution to the imbroglio lies in bilateral negotiations between the Philippines and the People’s Republic.
There has been much by way of angry (if not vituperative) polemics within official circles as well as well as within the media, but all that is largely along expected lines, as are the calls for restraint and sobriety.
In the wake of this verdict, whether or not accepted by China, any move by Beijing to set up an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the SCS will be very hard to sustain outside of outright military belligerency, since an ADIZ is essentially a measure to prevent transgressions into one’s territorial air space, and China’s view that the "nine-dash line" defines the limits of its national waters within the SCS has been roundly debunked.
We may certainly expect a high level of browbeating by Beijing and there is a good possibility of China extending her "terraforming" activity to the Scarborough Shoal.
However, with the USA and the Philippines having concluded a new Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) on March 18, 2016, which envisages US personnel and assets being integrated into (and rotated through) five existing bases of the Philippines, any future Freedom-of-Navigation (FON) operation by the US Navy to challenge such moves by China will be backed by extremely proximate US forces.
Past pro-China rhetoric of Philippine’s President Rodrigo Duterte notwithstanding, the significance of the USA’s sharp recovery from its 1992 loss of Subic Bay can hardly be lost upon Beijing.
This is not something that can be countered by coast guard forces or paramilitary militias, nor by the eminently newsworthy but militarily insignificant positioning of a few HQ-9 or equivalent SAMs as had been done on Woody Island in the Paracel Group.
Should China choose to stick to its guns, the outcome could be very sticky, indeed.