The Turkish Republic, since its emergence in 1923, was bound to follow the European ideals of secularisation-modernisation, as dictated by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Kemalism, through its built-in ideals, envisages a strong homogenised nation-state, governed by the political elite, supervised by the military and guarded by the judiciary.
Authoritarian Kemalist state, compared to a rather deprived society, attempted to bring the homogenised nation-state into force by employing the harshest measures. Nationalism and the notion of otherness have been instrumental in marginalising the wider sections of the society and the elite core, filtered out through the top-down approach of the Kemalist cadre to remain in control.
It alienated the religious Islamic groups from intra-elite politics on the one hand, pushing aside all non-Turkish identities, including Kurds. The dichotomy between Islam and Turkish nationalism created by the Kemalist secular elite led to a perpetual political tension.
Notwithstanding the Kemalist-secularist control over religion, Islam has always been a stronger force in deciding the fate of Turkish politics. With the ouster of Necmettin Erbekan, his general Cevik Bir - who had masterminded the former's heave-ho - realised Islam's inevitability and stated: "In Turkey we have a marriage of Islam and democracy..."
The child of this marriage is secularism, and it frequently falls ill. The Turkish Armed Forces play the doctor who saves the child. Although Kemalist Turkey had never been democratic in its true form, Islam has always been a constituent of the Turkish national identity, even under Kemal Ataturk. As a result of an unstable political situation and economic recession, the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) managed to come to power and started liquidating the stagnant "tutelage" by expediting the process of democratisation of the Turkish society.
By avoiding any substantial focus on its political Islamist ideology, the AKP began synergising with mainstream politics and introduced a series of democratic reforms in the system. The AKP government had promised to pursue Turkey's bid to secure EU membership, economic advancement, and the standardisation of the judicial system.
Abiding by the EU's directive of "civilianisation", it has abolished the death penalty, and by ushering several socio-economic reforms, including ratification of international human rights conventions, the AKP government put substantial checks on military-dominated intra-elite politics of Turkey.
Its megalomaniac leader Erdogan's pragmatic approach won him the support of business class, liberal intellectuals, and - to some extent - political legitimacy in the eyes of the military. But, these initial calls for democratisation of Turkey seem more likely a part and parcel of the AKP's survival strategy as one can clearly perceive an evident shift in Erdogan's policies - from democratisation to authoritarianism.
With his four consecutive electoral successes, Erdogan began monopolising powers to emerge as an immune political figure beyond any opposition. For this, the constitution needs amendments supported by the required majority and that can be achieved only by ensuring an opposition with no say. As the first priority, he silenced those media outlets that were hesitant in eulogising him. In addition, he employed further pre-emptive measures against the judiciary, political opponents and, in fact, all those who were even likely to be critical of the AKP's politics.
Developments in the aftermath of the infamous high-level corruption probe of 2013, allegedly launched by the Gülenists (which Erdogan later termed as "dirty conspiracy") instigated him to take harsher undemocratic measures.
He finally used July 15's failed coup d'état as an excuse to launch an immediate massive violent purge targeting innocent civilians, including teachers, university deans, prosecutors and judges, by profiling them as terrorists.
Instead of upholding the process of democratisation that he himself employed to strengthen the country's democratic institutions, Erdogan - now accused of being driven by neo-Ottomanism - is using the attempted coup as an opportunity to overthrow each and every possible opposition.
It has already been argued by Turkish officials that the restoration of death penalty can be a useful tool to mitigate the potential threats of future coups. Verily, the attempted coup was an attack on democracy and condemned by all corners of the world, but the measures taken by the country's president in its aftermath have wrought an even severe thrust on the country's democracy.
With the ongoing purging policies, persecutions, and dehumanisation of its own citizens in the wake of other radical changes, Turkey is consistently moving towards a paranoid dystopian state. It ought to return to the path of the republic, and not wait for the final nail to be hammered in the coffin of its democracy.