As Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is being welcomed in India this week, there is a sense that New Delhi is fast losing its carefully nurtured decade-old clout in Afghanistan. Compared to his predecessor Hamid Karzai, Ghani's response to India has been lukewarm. His visit to Delhi comes long after his reaching out to Pakistan and China, both of whom seem more firmly embedded in the peace overtures to the Taliban than India.
Ghani has been to Pakistan twice and the Afghan army chief recently attended the passing out parade at Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul. Ghani's government has also been keen to see China play a more active role in the reconciliation process. India stands isolated with many in the country wondering whatever happened to the much-hyped Delhi-Kabul strategic partnership. It is not that Delhi has not been active. Soon after the Modi government assumed office in India, his external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj visited Afghanistan in September to underscore India’s commitment to remain engaged in the country's reconstruction activities in a significant way. Describing India as Afghanistan's first strategic partner, Swaraj suggested that Delhi would always share the Afghan people's vision of a "strong" and "prosperous" Afghanistan.
Delhi has conveyed to the Ghani government in strong terms that India is there to support Afghanistan even after the Western troops pull out. The Modi government is keen on expanding its security profile in Afghanistan and has provided Kabul with military jeeps, choppers and automated weapons in a bid to strengthen the Army as a first step in that direction. It has also, after years of dilly-dallying under the previous government, taken a decision to invest $85.21 million in developing the strategically important Chabahar port in Iran, allowing India to circumvent Pakistan and open up a route to landlocked Afghanistan. But where Delhi was preoccupied internally over the last few years with a weak government unable to make up its mind on substantive defence engagement with Kabul, other actors - China in particular - have decided to step up their role. Ghani lost no time in reaching out to China, which he visited in October 2014, when China hosted a conference to discuss peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan. He even called on the Taliban, to join and enter the Afghan dialogue and China echoed Ghani's call urging groups to "lay aside former enmity and join the political reconciliation process". There was high flying rhetoric as Ghani said his country viewed China "as a strategic partner, in the short term, medium term, long term and very long term".
Chinese President Xi Jinping reciprocated by hailing Ghani as an old friend of the Chinese people with whom his country prepared to work towards "a new era of co-operation" and "to take development to a new depth”. Despite China's concerns that a deteriorating security situation could threaten greater investment, it has agreed to give Afghanistan $327 million in aid over the next three years - $81.8 million in 2014 and the remaining sum between 2015 and 2017. More significantly, China also agreed to act as a mediator between Afghanistan and Pakistan while Ghani has pledged to help China fight its own Islamic militants. Both Beijing and Kabul recognise each other’s importance.
Afghanistan has requested assistance from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in its fight against the Taliban. Providing assistance to Afghanistan may form a part of Chinese President Xi Jinping's wider plan to establish a 6,437km "Silk Road" economic belt to connect China's western regions with Europe through Central Asia.
Security concerns have prevented Chinese investments in Afghanistan from getting off the ground. China is interested in playing a larger role in Afghanistan, long seen as primarily a US responsibility after its 2001 invasion. China's Afghan policy is now feeling the pressure emanating from the withdrawal of western troops and the Taliban surge threatening to give a boost to Islamist militancy in China's western Xinjiang region. Like the rest of the region, China remains worried about the withdrawal of western forces from Afghanistan as it fears a broader destabilisation of the region post 2014.
The growing problems in Pakistan have also alerted China to the reality that its leverage over Pakistan may not be enough in managing the regional turmoil. As tensions build in Xinjiang, the perceived Pakistan link to Uighur militancy has led to a reassessment in the Chinese approach towards Afghanistan, especially as concerns are rising in Beijing that Islamabad has not been very effective in controlling the training of Uighur militants in Pakistan. For all the hyperbole, the Chinese president's visit to Pakistan last week should also be assessed in this context.
Ghani's visit to New Delhi this week is an important opportunity for India to underline its role in the unfolding strategic dynamics in the region. The Modi government will have to make it clear to Ghani that unlike its predecessor, it takes its responsibilities as a regional power seriously. Beijing is widely considered a more credible regional player and this has enhanced its profile in Afghanistan as well. India, despite being the nation most loved by ordinary Afghans, has given an impression that it is not serious about making hard choices.
Time has now come to change that impression, and Modi government is well positioned to do it.